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TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RECOGNITION POWER
Lance F. Sorenson*
Abstract
Scholars who criticize the Supreme Court’s doctrine regarding Native
American tribal sovereignty have not yet addressed a fundamental
constitutional concern. The Supreme Court has appropriated the
recognition power through the judicially created doctrine of implicit
divestiture, by which the Court presumes that Indian tribes and nations
have lost all aspects of tribal sovereignty the Court deems “inconsistent”
with the tribes’ “dependent status.” This practice of “judicial deRecognition” violates the separation of powers. Implicit divestiture has
resulted in a presumption that “All sovereignty is lost except that which is
specifically retained.” Through implicit divestiture, the Court has gone far
beyond its normal judicial duties of regulating boundaries among
sovereigns, constructing appropriate federal common law or implementing
federal policy.
In light of the Supreme Court’s recent pronouncements regarding the
recognition power, now is a good time for the Court to re-evaluate its own
role in tribal recognition. Rather than appropriating the authority to derecognize tribal sovereignty, the Supreme Court should adopt a rule of
“explicit divestiture.” That is, “All sovereignty is retained except that
which is specifically and constitutionally surrendered.” Under this
doctrine, the Court would give greater deference to the political branches
to determine tribal sovereignty while simultaneously encouraging them to
adopt clear statements of federal policy regarding the same, relieving the
judiciary of the burden of sifting through the vast historical record to
determine ambiguous federal policy and losses or retentions of sovereignty.
The Court would also avoid violating the separation of powers.
Such judicial deference to the political branches on the issue of
recognition would not preclude the Court from fulfilling its judicial role of
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considering the constitutional limits of congressional, executive, or state
power to infringe upon traditional aspects of tribal sovereignty, and it
would not preclude the Court from considering the possible constitutional
status of tribes. The Court could still employ a “judicial shield” to protect
tribal sovereignty from unconstitutional encroachments by the national or
state governments, but it would lay down its “judicial sword” to intrude
upon sovereignty itself.
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I. Introduction
Native American tribal sovereignty is a constitutional puzzle constantly
worked upon, but never quite solved. Many of the questions that faced the
framers and early interpreters of the Constitution continue to perplex
modern judges, policy makers, and scholars.1 Indeed, the Court in its 2015
term dealt with the question of tribal sovereignty in three cases2 and at least
once in its 2016 and 2017 terms.3 Given the sharp division of the Court and
the many “grey areas” of tribal jurisdiction,4 it is likely that issues of Native

1. Professor Frank Pommersheim, in anticipation of the Court’s ruling in United States
v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004), suggested that the “heart” of the issue was, “[W]hat exactly
should be the position of tribal sovereignty in a constitutional republic as we head into the
twenty-first century?” Frank Pommersheim, Lara: A Constitutional Crisis in Indian Law? 28
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 299, 305 (2003-2004).
2. In Dollar General Corporation v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct.
2159 (2016), the Court split 4-4 and thus affirmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit, which
held in favor of tribal jurisdiction over a civil tort claim filed by a member against a nonmember corporation for a tort alleged to have taken place on reservation land. In United
States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016), a unanimous Court affirmed that uncounseled tribal
convictions may be used as predicate offenses in a federal criminal sentencing, even if
analogous predicates in state courts could not be used due to Sixth Amendment violations.
Finally, in Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016), tribal sovereignty was not
directly at issue, but the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions all engaged the
question of tribal sovereignty, revealing continued disagreement, with Justice Thomas
renewing his call for judicial re-examination and overhaul of the entirety of federal Indian
law jurisprudence. Id. at 1877. Two other cases from the 2015 term involving tribes,
Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 750 (2016), and Nebraska
v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016), did not directly touch upon sovereignty issues, but might
be useful in tribal sovereign recognition cases.
3. See Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285 (2017) (finding tribal sovereign immunity was
not implicated in an action against a tribal employee for a tort committed in his individual
capacity); see also United States v. Washington, No. 17-269 (U.S. argued Apr. 18, 2018).
4. See Addie C. Rolnick, Recentering Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction, 63 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 1638 (2016) (discussing five “grey areas” of tribal criminal jurisdiction); see also Alex
Tallchief Skibine, Constitutionalism, Federal Common Law, and the Inherent Powers of
Indian Tribes, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 77, 79 (2014-2015) (suggesting that the recently
enacted Indian provisions of the Violence Against Women Act reauthorization are likely to
spark further litigation).
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American sovereignty will continue to find their way to the highest tribunal
for some time to come.5
Some of the perennial issues are: Where do Indian tribes and nations fit,
if at all, within the United States’ constitutional framework? Do tribes
retain aboriginal sovereignty and, if so, how much? Does Congress have
plenary power to legislate on behalf of tribes and, if so, what is the source
of this power? Can we ask these questions without first addressing
threshold questions—can tribes, who did not consent to the Constitution, be
neatly placed within it, and should they? To what extent may United States
constitutional values, such as those found within the Establishment and
Equal Protection Clauses, be imposed on tribes? And, perhaps most
importantly, who gets to decide all these issues?
This Article argues that the judiciary has often waded into difficult and
contentious issues related to tribal sovereignty—such as tribal criminal and
civil jurisdiction over non-Indians6—without first explicitly engaging with
fundamental separation of powers questions: What is the role of the
recognition power with respect to tribes, and what constitutes tribal
recognition, de-recognition and non-recognition? A lack of attention to the
recognition power has led to questionable judicial practices—specifically,
the creation of a de facto judicial de-recognition power as well as the
misreading of congressional and executive actions, such as the
discontinuance of treaty making with tribes.7

5. The even split in Dollar General, 136 S. Ct. 2159, masks further divisions that were
on display in earlier cases such as Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (three concurrences and one dissent)
and Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013) (two concurrences and two
dissents).
6. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (holding that
tribes lacked jurisdiction to try non-members in tribal courts for crimes occurring on Indian
land); see also Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (limiting a tribe’s civil
authority over non-Indians within reservations). Most scholars trace the modern articulation
of the implicit divestiture doctrine to Oliphant. See, e.g., Skibine, supra note 4, at 85-87.
Montana extended the Court’s implicit divestiture framework to apply in the civil arena as
well.
7. Justice Thomas has indicated, as part of his repeated calls for an overhaul of the
jurisprudence of Native American sovereignty, that he would “ascribe much more
significance to legislation such as the Act” that terminated treaty making with the tribes.
Lara, 541 U.S. at 215 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat.
566). In County of Yakima v. Confederate Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502
U.S. 251, 257-58 (1992), the Court cited the same Act as part of federal efforts to subject
tribes to substantial federal and state criminal and civil regulatory regimes, stating that
notions of Indian sovereignty have, “over time, lost their independent sway.”
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Closer attention to the recognition power—the power to recognize or not
recognize sovereign states and ruling governments—suggests a more
limited role for the judiciary. The judicially created doctrine of “implicit
divestiture” has served as a mask for the unconstitutional practice of
judicial de-recognition. Implicit divestiture is the doctrine that Indian tribes
and nations lose sovereign powers not only by express treaty provisions or
through statute, but also by implication where the attempted exercise of
sovereignty is “inconsistent” with their “dependent status.”8 This third
category has been the source of judicial mischief. According to the Court,
the question of whether a sovereign power is “inconsistent” with a tribe’s
status may be decided by the Court itself in the absence of a statement from
the political branches. While the Court often grapples with the source of
congressional or executive authority to exercise governmental power, the
Court has never asked, let alone answered, the question of where it, as a
judicial institution, derives the authority to de-recognize the sovereign
powers of tribes. The recognition power, which includes the powers of derecognition and non-recognition, is an executive, not a judicial, power. In
short, the Court has misappropriated a constitutional power belonging to the
political branches in federal Indian law.
For example, the Court has held through judicial de-recognition/implicit
divestiture that tribes: do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians;9
do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians;10 do not have
regulatory authority over non-members on fee lands within a reservation
(absent very narrowly-drawn exceptions);11 do not have jurisdiction over a
members’ tort and civil rights claims against state officers for acts alleged
to have occurred on tribal lands;12 do not have civil jurisdiction over a tort
claim between two non-members occurring on a state highway running
across reservation land;13 do not have the power to tax non-members on
non-Indian land within a reservation;14 and do not have jurisdiction to
8. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (“Indian tribes still possess
those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a
necessary result of their dependent status.”); see also Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208 (“Indian
tribes are prohibited from exercising . . . those powers ‘inconsistent with their status.’”).
9. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 195.
10. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990) (overturned by congressional statute); see
Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077b, 104 Stat. 1856, 1892-93), recognized by
Lara, 541 U.S. at 193-94).
11. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
12. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 364 (2001).
13. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997).
14. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 659 (2001).
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review the sale of non-Indian land within a reservation.15 In all of these
cases, the Court used an implicit divestiture framework to find that the
tribes had been divested of various sovereign powers which autonomous
states normally exercise, on the basis that such powers were inconsistent
with the tribes’ “status” and were not essential to the health, safety and
welfare of the tribes.16 And in all of these cases, Congress and the executive
branch were silent on the specific issue before the Court, except for
scattered and contradictory statements made anytime between the founding
and the present. In the absence of a clear statement from the political
branches affirming or de-recognizing these aspects of tribal sovereignty, the
Court proceeded to de-recognize them though judicial fiat. The Court
engaged in judicial conquest. The Court’s holdings under its implicit
divestiture doctrine go much further than merely regulating boundaries
between sovereigns; they de-recognize sovereign authority altogether—a
power constitutionally vested in, and traditionally left to, the political
branches.17
Implicit divestiture has critics already. Matthew L.M. Fletcher uses
several pages of his hornbook, Federal Indian Law, to critique the “shabby”
historical work of the Court in Oliphant, the genesis of the modern implicit
divestiture doctrine.18 In addition, Bethany Berger asserts that the line of
implicit divestiture cases rest upon two faulty assumptions: that tribal courts
treat non-Indians unfairly and that criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians is
not crucial to tribal self-government.19 Two other critics, Michalyn Steele
and Addie Rolnick, raise functional and practical concerns with implicit
15. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316,
332(2008).
16. Andrew Fletcher calls Oliphant, Montana and Nevada v. Hicks the “colonial
trilogy,” drawing a comparison with the Marshall Trilogy, discussed herein. According to
Fletcher, the “colonial trilogy” continues the work of nineteenth century conquest. Andrew
K. Fletcher, Suffocating Sovereignty: Implicit Divestiture and the Violation of First
Principles, 5 DARTMOUTH L.J. 31, 48 (2007).
17. This Article argues that the judiciary is not empowered under our constitutional
system to de-recognize Native American tribes or aspects of their sovereignty. One might
wonder whether the judiciary may recognize tribes in instances where the political branches
have not done so through the BIA’s Federal Recognition process. Although the judiciary
may not appropriate the recognition power to recognize a newly formed tribe, it may
“recognize,” or take judicial notice of, a tribe that has always existed and whose status as
such in the eyes of the United States has never been altered. In such a case, the judiciary
would only maintain the status quo, which is not an act of recognition.
18. MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 345-58 (2016).
19. Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in
Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047 (2005).
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divestiture and propose alternative approaches discussed herein.20 Others
attack implicit divestiture from additional angles.21
These criticisms are important, but remain largely in the realm of policy
or practicality. I write separately to raise an important and fundamental
constitutional concern yet to be discussed. The Court, by making judicial
determinations that various tribal actions are “inconsistent with their status”
has appropriated for itself a constitutional power that is vested in the
political branches, not the Article III judiciary. Implicit divestiture is more
than just a bad idea: it violates the separation of powers. The Constitution
contemplates the political branches’ better institutional competency in
foreign relations and addresses it through the vesting of the Recognition
Power. Even absent this constitutional issue, the Court is not well-situated
to ascertain historical losses of sovereignty. The Court’s black-and-white,
all-or-nothing legal approach to sovereignty lacks the more adaptive and
creative approaches that the political branches often employ when dealing
with sovereign entities, both foreign and domestic.
Rather than exercising an unconstitutional and unwieldy judicial
recognition power through implicit divestiture, the Court should adopt a
rule of explicit divestiture. Under this doctrine, the Court would continue to
“recognize” divestiture of sovereignty through treaty, reviewing those
agreements in accordance with well-established principles for the
interpretation of treaties between the United States and Native peoples.22
The Court would also analyze divestiture of sovereignty by statute to ensure
that such statutes comport with the constitutional limitations on Congress
and the executive branch.23 The Court should abandon the implicit
20. See Michalyn Steele, Plenary Power, Political Questions, and Sovereignty in Indian
Affairs, 63 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 666 (2016); see also Rolnick, supra note 4. Given the
similarities of the approaches suggested in this Article to those proposed by Steele and
Rolnick, I highlight some key differences between them in Part III.
21. Robert Clinton helpfully created a long, but non-exhaustive list of articles critical of
implicit divestiture up to 2002. Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause
for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 207-08 n.282 (2002). For criticism since 2002, see,
for example, Frank Pommersheim, At the Crossroads: A New and Unfortunate Paradigm of
Tribal Sovereignty, 55. S.D. L. REV. 48 (2010); Samuel Ennis, Implicit Divestiture and the
Supreme Court’s (Re)Construction of the Indian Canons, 35 VT. L. REV. 623 (2011).
22. Longstanding rules of Indian treaty construction state that courts are to construe
treaties in “the sense in which they would naturally be understood by the Indians” and not to
their prejudice. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n,
443 U.S. 658, 676 (1979) (internal quotation omitted); see also Antoine v. Washington, 420
U.S. 194, 199 (1975).
23. Adjusting tribal sovereignty through statute, rather than treaty, raises its own set of
constitutional concerns that are beyond the scope of this paper. For an argument that the
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divestiture framework—the third prong of divestiture—set forth in its
Oliphant and Montana cases and adopt a position that all sovereignty is
retained, except that which has been explicitly and constitutionally
divested.24 In cases where statutes and executive policies regarding the
exercise of a particular sovereign power by the tribes is ambiguous, the
Court should presume continued aboriginal sovereignty, consistent with the
tribes’ ancient status. The Court should do no more than maintain the status
quo, leaving space for the political branches to act. The Court could,
however, police the established jurisdictional boundaries among the tribes,
states, and federal government, reserving for itself a judicial role to
investigate the sources of congressional and state sovereign powers when
they abut tribal ones. This approach not only frees the Court from
ascertaining divestiture by implication (which by its nature is difficult to
determine), but it also provides a better framework for addressing the
sovereignty of a large and diverse number of tribes.
This Article is divided into three parts. Part I gives an overview of both
the recognition power and implicit divestiture, and explains how implicit
divestiture misappropriates the political branches’ power. Potential defenses
of implicit divestiture and why they fail to rescue this unconstitutional
doctrine are examined in Part II. Finally, Part III discusses why an explicit
divestiture doctrine is a better approach to tribal sovereignty, and how it
would apply in cases past and present, comparing and contrasting it with
other proposals. This analysis includes a discussion of how the Supreme
Court may preserve a role for itself to engage in appropriate constitutional
analysis regarding tribal sovereignty, thereby maintaining a process by
which tribal sovereignty may be protected by a judicial shield from
intrusion by the national or state governments, even as the Court lays down
its judicial sword.
This Article is consistent with the goal articulated by Alex Tallchief
Skibine to “constitutionalize” tribal sovereignty25 by (1) demonstrating that
United States should interact through tribes exclusively by treaty, see VINE DELORIA JR. &
DAVID E. WILKINS, TRIBES, TREATIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBULATIONS 161 (1999).
24. This approach would be consistent with that proposed by Justice Thurgood
Marshall, in his Oliphant dissent, who suggests that tribes retain “necessary aspect[s]” of
their sovereignty that are not withdrawn by treaty or statute. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
25. Skibine, supra note 4, at 81 (“[T]he time has come to integrate federal Indian law
into constitutional law. From being ‘exceptional,’ federal common law relating to the status
of Indian tribes as sovereign government has just become ‘exceptionally’ bad. . . . There is
no need to place federal Indian law in ‘de-constitutionalized zones,’ or ‘walling of Federal
Indian law from mainstream constitutional discourse.’”).
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the Court has misappropriated the recognition power; and (2) demonstrating
that the Constitution is capable of resolving the puzzling questions of tribal
sovereignty, both in its own acknowledgement of tribal sovereignty as well
as its vesting of the recognition power. The Constitution vests the
executive, in the least, or the political branches together, at most, with the
power to recognize and de-recognize tribal sovereignty.26
II. Implicit Divestiture and the Misappropriation of the Recognition Power
A. The Recognition Power – An Overview
Recognition is the “formal acknowledgement that a particular entity
possesses the qualifications of statehood or that a particular regime is the
effective government of a state.”27 Despite the fact that the power to
recognize sovereign entities and their governments is a fundamental
function of the federal government, the words “recognize,” “recognition,”
and their cognates do not appear in the Constitution.28 Robert Reinstein
suggests that while the Framers were anxious for foreign recognition of
their new Republic, “the idea that the United States would need to
recognize foreign states and governments was simply not a pressing issue
or even something that would predictably occur.”29 No matter the reason for
the omission, the recognition power is derived from other explicitly
mentioned powers related to foreign affairs.
Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution vests executive power in the
President. Sections 2 and 3 describe the powers and duties of the
President.30 Some executive powers related to foreign affairs, such as the
26. Whether the Recognition Power in Indian Affairs belongs exclusively to the
Executive, as the Court says it does in foreign affairs, or is a shared power between Congress
and the President, is an open question. This author is of the view that it is a shared power.
One thing it is not—a judicial power. Ennis, supra note 21.
27. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084 (2015) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Robert J. Reinstein, Recognition: A Case
Study on the Original Understanding of Executive Power, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 801 (2011)
(discussing the history of the Recognition Power).
28. See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2084 (“Despite the importance of the recognition power
in foreign relations, the Constitution does not use the term ‘recognition,’ either in Article II
or elsewhere.”)
29. Robert J. Reinstein, Is the President’s Recognition Power Exclusive? 86 TEMPLE L.
REV. 1, 6 (2013).
30. U.S. CONST. art. II. Ascertaining the limits of those powers, and their interplay with
the legislative branch, is usually governed by Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-55 (1952). Interestingly, Article II’s vesting
clause vests the “executive power” in the President, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, while Article I’s
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treaty-making power and the appointments of ambassadors, are subject to
the advice and consent of the Senate.31 Others, like the reception of foreign
ambassadors, may be exercised without Senate approval.32 Recognition is
not only a fundamental aspect of foreign diplomacy, but has domestic legal
consequences. Recognized sovereigns “may sue in United States courts and
may benefit from sovereign immunity when they are sued.”33 The Supreme
Court’s most recent investigation of the recognition power yielded an
opinion holding that the power is exclusive to the executive, whose
determinations may not be overruled by Congress.34
There is no constitutionally prescribed method for exercising the
recognition power. Recognition is often explicit by formal declaration,35 but
may also be implied.36 For example, when President George Washington
received Citizen Genet as the ambassador of France, he impliedly
recognized the legitimacy of the new French revolutionary government. 37
More recently, although the United States did not formally recognize the
sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) between 1949 and
1979, it nevertheless impliedly recognized its de facto authority over
mainland China by conducting high level ambassadorial talks, including
President Nixon’s visit to mainland China and his meetings with Mao
Zedong in 1972. President Carter issued a formal declaration of recognition
of the PRC in 1979.38
Encompassed within the recognition power is the power to decline to
recognize a state or government (non-recognition) and the power to
withdraw recognition from a previously existing state or government

vesting clause vests only those legislative powers “herein granted,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
For possible implications of this difference, see Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D.
Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001).
31. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
32. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
33. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2084 (citation omitted).
34. Id. at 2076.
35. See, e.g., Press Release, Exec. Office of the President, U.S. Recognition of the
Provisional Government of the State of Israel (May 14, 1948), https://www.archives.gov/
files/education/lessons/us-israel/images/recognition-press-release-l.jpg.
36. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2084 (“[Recognition] may also be implied—for example,
by concluding a bilateral treaty or by sending or receiving diplomatic [guests].”).
37. See Reinstein, supra note 27, at 840; see also Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2091-92.
38. President Jimmy Carter, Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and the
People’s Republic of China: United States Statement (Dec. 15, 1978), AM. PRESIDENCY
PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=30309&st=China&st1=.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol42/iss1/2

No. 1]

TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY & RECOGNITION POWER

79

deemed no longer existing or otherwise not legitimate (de-recognition).39
The United States, through the executive, has invoked non-recognition in a
variety of foreign affairs contexts. President Woodrow Wilson chose not to
recognize Victoriano Huerta and his administration as the ruling authority
of Mexico in 1913, despite the earlier activities of the United States’
ambassador to bring Huerta into power.40 Presidents Wilson, Harding,
Coolidge, and Hoover did not recognize the Bolshevik government as the
ruling authority in Russia, nor did they recognize the USSR as a sovereign
entity.41 And President Hoover chose not to recognize Manchukuo in
1931.42 The exercise of the de-recognition power usually follows internal
regime change or war. For example, thirty years following the Chinese
Civil War, President Carter de-recognized the Republic of China (ROC) as
the sovereign government of China.43
As with the exercise of the recognition power, there is no constitutionally
prescribed method for exercising the non-recognition or de-recognition
power. President Carter, for example, unilaterally nullified the SinoAmerican Mutual Defense Treaty, by which the United States had pledged
support to the ROC in the defense of Taiwan if it was invaded.44 The
nullification was, according to Carter, a necessary step to formal
recognition of the PRC’s sovereignty over China, and effectively derecognized any claim to sovereignty over mainland China by the ROC.45 As
with recognition, de-recognition may be accomplished explicitly or through
implication.
Importantly, the United States has often adopted a nuanced, even
ambiguous, approach to the sovereign status of various foreign entities for a
variety of reasons, prominent among them a desire to avoid the
precipitation of hostilities.46 Even as President Carter de-recognized the
39. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2091-92 (citing 2 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 1, at 1 (1963)).
40. Peter V. N. Henderson, Woodrow Wilson, Victoriano Huerta and the Recognition
Issue in Mexico, 41 THE AMERICAS 151 (1984).
41. J.H. Wilson, American Business and the Recognition of the Soviet Union, 52 SOC.
SCI. Q. 349, 368 (1971).
42. Richard N. Current, The Stimson Doctrine and the Hoover Doctrine, 59 AM. HIST.
REV. 513, 542 (1954).
43. See Jonathan M. Kayes, The Republic of China and Derecognition, 34 J. INT’L AFF.
191, 194 (1980).
44. Id. at 191.
45. Id. at 194.
46. See Lin v. United States, 561 F.3d 502, 505 (D.C. Ct. App. 2009) (characterizing the
United States’ relationship with Taiwan as one of “strategic ambiguity”).
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ROC’s authority over mainland China, Congress passed the Taiwan
Relations Act, and the United States continues to maintain quasi-diplomatic
relations with the ROC in Taiwan.47 It has been the policy of several
administrations to avoid adopting an “all-or-nothing” approach to the
sovereignty of Taiwan. The United States studiously avoids asserting PRC
or ROC control of the island, only “acknowledging” the PRC’s position that
it has complete sovereignty there.48 Similarly, the United States walks a
diplomatic tightrope with Israel, Palestine, and Jerusalem,49 as well as a
host of other “hotspots” around the globe.
Because of the complex nature of foreign affairs, and because foreign
relations necessarily reflect foreign policy, the political branches are much
better suited than the judiciary to make determinations about recognition,
non-recognition, and de-recognition. Indeed, whenever the issue of the
appropriateness of foreign sovereign recognition has come before the
United States Supreme Court, the Court has shown extreme deference to the
political branches, particularly the executive. In Goldwater v. Carter,50
when Senator Barry Goldwater and several other senators alleged that
President Carter lacked authority to nullify the Sino-American Defense
Treaty without Senate approval, the Court refused to review President
Carter’s action, and directed the Complaint be dismissed.51 Although they
disagreed on the reasons for the dismissal, none of the justices indicated
that the Court itself should have any say in determining the sovereign status
of Taiwan; they only disagreed on the question of whether the Court could
decide who, between the political branches, makes the substantive
decision.52 More recently, the Court found a recognition question to be
47. See Pasha L. Hsieh, An Unrecognized State in Foreign and International Courts:
The Case of the Republic of China on Taiwan, 28 MICH. J. INT’L LAW 765, 779-80 (2007)
(“U.S. courts have consistently held that on the basis of the TRA, the ROC-US Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation continues to be effective. They observed that the
United States maintains ‘de facto’ recognition of Taiwan and U.S.-Taiwan relations are
‘quasi-governmental relations.’”).
48. See Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the
United States of America and the People’s Republic of China: January 1, 1979 (Dec. 15,
1978), https://photos.state.gov/libraries/ait-taiwan/171414/ait-pages/prc_e.pdf.
49. The subject of the Court’s most recent pronouncement of the Recognition Power
involved assertions of sovereignty over Jerusalem. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry,
135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
50. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
51. Id. at 997.
52. Id. at 1007 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Our cases firmly establish that the
Constitution commits to the President alone the power to recognize, and to withdraw
recognition from, foreign regimes.”).
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justiciable and resolved a constitutional dispute between the political
branches in Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry.53 Given the Court’s
extensive investigation of the recognition power in Zivotofsky, a closer
examination of that case is informative for thinking about recognition in the
context of Native American sovereignty.
Longstanding federal executive policy has been to decline to recognize
any entity as having sovereignty over Jerusalem.54 The State Department, in
issuing passports to United States citizens born in Jerusalem, refuses to list
“Jerusalem, Israel” as the place of birth on passports.55 Rather, it lists the
place of birth simply as “Jerusalem.”56 Congress, however, passed the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act in 2002, which includes a provision
requiring the Secretary of State to list Israel as the place of birth for United
States citizens born in Jerusalem who make such a request.57 President
George W. Bush, when signing the bill into law, issued a signing statement
to indicate that he interpreted the provision as “advisory,” not as a
mandate.58 He declined Congress’s “advice,” as did his successor in office,
President Obama.59 When petitioners in Zivotofsky sought issuance of a
passport listing “Jerusalem, Israel” as the place of birth for their newborn
and the State Department declined, the constitutionality of the statute was
placed before the Supreme Court.60
The Court held that the executive holds the exclusive power to recognize
foreign sovereigns and that the provision of the statute at issue was an
unconstitutional intrusion into the executive’s prerogative.61 The Court’s
reasoning was based in a textual, structural, and functional reading of the
Constitution.62 The Court found that although the recognition power was
not vested explicitly as such, and although some presidential prerogatives in
foreign affairs were subject to Senate approval, foreign affairs generally
were vested with the executive.63 Further, the Court stated that it was
53. 135 S. Ct. 2076.
54. Id. at 2081.
55. Id. at 2082.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. President George W. Bush, Statement on the Signing of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Sept. 30, 2002),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=63928.
59. Presidential Determination No. 2017-3, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,973 (Dec. 1, 2016).
60. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2083.
61. Id. at 2096.
62. See id. at 2086.
63. See id. at 2085-87.
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important for the United States to “‘speak . . . with one voice’” on the issue
of recognition.64
Given the uniqueness of Native American tribes in the United States
constitutional system, the Court in Zivotofsky declined to review and apply
cases involving tribal sovereignty as precedent.65 Nevertheless, the opinion
is instructive for its acknowledgment of the limited role of the judiciary in
“delicate,” “difficult,” and “complex” affairs of recognition.66 “In our
constitutional system these matters are committed to the Legislature and the
Executive, not the Judiciary.”67 In Zivotofsky, no one asked for the Court’s
opinion on the sovereign status of Jerusalem, but only for a ruling on who
gets to make the decision.68 It would have been unconstitutional, according
to the Court’s own framing of the issue, if the Court had attempted to
determine the issue itself by holding that Jerusalem is or is not part of
Israel. Similarly, in earlier cases, no one asked for the Court’s opinion on
the appropriate diplomatic relationship the United States should have with
Taiwan, or Palestine, or Israel, or Cuba, or any other country. It would be
presumptuous and unconstitutional for the Court to hold forth on such
matters. It is plausible to suggest that the Court might precipitate an
international crisis if it were to hold, for example, that Taiwan, or Israel, or
Ukraine have been divested of various aspects of sovereignty. And yet, in
the context of tribal recognition, the Court has done just that, under the
guise of implicit divestiture.
B. Implicit Divestiture – An Overview
In 1978, the Court laid the foundation for the modern jurisprudence of
tribal sovereignty in three opinions decided within a span of two months.
The Court first articulated what came to be known as the implicit
divestiture doctrine in 1978 in Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe.69 In Oliphant,
the Court confronted the issue of whether the Suquamish Tribe had
jurisdiction to arrest and try a non-Indian accused of committing a crime on
tribal land.70 Mark David Oliphant, a non-Indian living on the Port Madison
64. Id. at 2086 (quoting American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 369, 424 (2003)).
65. Id. at 2090-91 (“Other cases describing a shared power address the recognition of
Indian tribes—which is, similarly, a distinct issue from the recognition of foreign
countries.”).
66. Id. at 2081.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 2083.
69. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
70. Id. at 194-95.
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Indian Reservation in Washington, had been charged in tribal court with
assault and resisting arrest.71 Oliphant, through the habeas procedures of the
Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA)72 challenged the exercise of criminal
jurisdiction by the Tribe over him by virtue of his not being an Indian. 73
Although the lower courts upheld the right of the Tribe to try Oliphant, the
Supreme Court disagreed.74
In holding that the Tribe lacked jurisdiction over Oliphant, the Court
reviewed the lengthy history of the Suquamish with the United States,
searching in vain for an explicit treaty or congressional statute by which the
Suquamish relinquished criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.75 After
finding some treaty provisions that were tangentially related to the matter,
the Court stated, “By themselves, these treaty provisions would probably
not be sufficient to remove criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians if the
Tribe otherwise retained such jurisdiction.”76 The Court could have
concluded its opinion there and held that the Tribe retained such
jurisdiction. However, the Court continued and found that
[E]ven ignoring treaty provisions and congressional policy,
Indians do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians absent
affirmative delegation of such power by Congress. . . . Indian
tribes are prohibited from exercising both those powers of
autonomous states that are expressly terminated by Congress and
those powers “inconsistent with their status.”77
This question—whether the Tribe was attempting to exercise a power
“inconsistent with [its] status”—was a new kind of judicial inquiry, one not
contemplated by previous courts. This framework for ruling on the
existence of tribal sovereign powers raised more issues than it resolved.
First, what does it mean to exercise a power “inconsistent with their
status?” Second, and more importantly, who gets to make that decision?
And third, does the loss of sovereign power by historical implication rise to
constitutional status? That is, once lost, is it gone forever, or can it be
restored? The Court answered the first two questions in Oliphant (and its
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
1976)).

Id. at 194.
Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. IV, 82 Stat. 78 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2012)).
Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194.
Id. at 194-95.
Id. at 196-212.
Id. at 208.
Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir.
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progeny) and addressed the third question in United States v. Lara,
discussed herein.
In Oliphant, the Court analyzed whether the exercise of criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians was consistent with the Tribe’s “status,”
finding that it was not.78 The Court justified its finding by reference to
various clippings from American history, including the Non-Intercourse
Act of 1790, an opinion of the United State Attorney General from 1834,
and the opinion of a federal judge from 1878.79 The Court did not find
express statements from the political branches on the issue.80 Indeed, the
Court framed the issue in such a way that it was unlikely to rule in the
Tribe’s favor.81 In the beginning of the discussion, the Court stated,
“Respondents do not contend that their exercise of criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians stems from affirmative congressional authorization or
treaty provision.”82 And why should they have so contended? Prior
decisions had acknowledged the domestic nation status of tribes.83
Although the Court concluded the opinion by inviting Congress to address
the issue, the Court took upon itself the role of adjudicating whether aspects
of sovereignty were consistent with tribes’ status without first addressing
whether the judiciary is the branch of government the Constitution vests
with such power.84
The troubling potential consequences of the Oliphant decision may have
been obscured partly by two other cases from 1978, both of which affirmed
aspects of tribal sovereignty. The second foundational decision in 1978 was
United States v. Wheeler.85 There, the Court was asked to determine
whether the dual sovereignty doctrine was applicable in a case involving
tribal courts.86 The dual sovereignty doctrine posits that the constitutional
prohibition on being tried twice for the same crime (double jeopardy) is not
implicated when a defendant is prosecuted by separate sovereigns, even for
the same underlying conduct.87 Thus, a defendant who is tried by a state for
78. Id.
79. Id. at 199-201 (citing Non-Intercourse Act of 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137; 2 Op. Att’y
Gen. 693 (1834); Ex parte Kenyon, 14 Fed. Cas. 353 (W.D. Ark. 1878)).
80. Id. at 204.
81. See id.
82. Id. at 195.
83. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 10 (1831).
84. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212.
85. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
86. Id. at 314.
87. See United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922); see also Abbate v. United
States, 359 U.S. 187, 195-96 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 122-24 (1959).
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criminal conduct cannot invoke the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth
Amendment when he is tried by the United States for the same conduct.
The underlying theory is that he has committed two offenses, one against
the individual state and one against the United States.88 The question in
Wheeler was whether an individual who had been tried in a tribal court
could invoke double jeopardy to avoid prosecution by the United States for
the same underlying conduct, or whether the dual sovereignty doctrine
would nullify double jeopardy.89 The Court held the dual sovereignty
doctrine did apply. That is, the involved tribe in this case, the Navajo
Nation, had not surrendered its sovereign power to try and punish tribal
members for violating tribal law.90 In doing so, the Navajo Nation acted as
an independent sovereign, and not an extension of the federal government.
Thus, the defendant was precluded from taking advantage of the double
jeopardy clause. The Court in Wheeler succinctly formulated the new
implicit divestiture doctrine: “Indian tribes still possess those aspects of
sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a
necessary result of their dependent status.”91 The Court engaged in a brief
implicit divestiture analysis, finding that the “powers of self-government,
including the power to prescribe and enforce internal criminal laws, . . .
[were] not such powers as would necessarily be lost by virtue of a tribe’s
dependent status.”92
Similarly, in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,93 decided a few weeks
later, the Court again refused to disturb tribal sovereignty. At issue was
whether the ICRA, which applied many provisions of the Bill of Rights to
tribal governance, created a civil cause of action against a tribe for an
alleged violation of equal protection in its method of regulating
membership.94 The Tribe’s membership rules were clearly based on gender,
creating different outcomes for female and male members of the Tribe. Yet
the Court ruled in favor of the Tribe, refusing to find an implied civil cause
of action within the ICRA, which, the majority held, only created a federal
88. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 131-32 (“Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a
State or territory. . . . That either or both may (if they see fit) punish such an offender, cannot
be doubted. Yet it cannot be truly averred that the offender has been twice punished for the
same offence; but only that by one act he has committed two offences, for each of which he
is justly punishable.”) (quoting Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 20 (1852)).
89. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 314.
90. Id. at 321-22.
91. Id. at 323.
92. Id. at 326.
93. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
94. Id. at 63-64.
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habeas corpus procedure for criminal cases.95 The case was decided as a
matter of textual interpretation; the Court did not engage with the third
prong of Oliphant. Rather, the Court uncharacteristically decided to “tread
lightly in the absence of clear indications of legislative intent.”96
Essentially, the Court ignored implicit divestiture. Justice Thurgood
Marshall, who authored the opinion, had dissented in Oliphant where he
argued against the adoption of implicit divestiture.97
Read together, Oliphant and Wheeler create an analytical framework in
which tribes retain an inherent aboriginal sovereignty, derived from a
source distinct from that of the United States and the several states. Such
sovereignty can be divested through treaty, statute, or by implication.98
Additionally, Santa Clara Pueblo indicated the Court would not secondguess tribal rules regarding membership, even where membership rules
might raise constitutional concerns in other governmental contexts.99 And
although Oliphant created a new judicial power, Wheeler and Santa Clara
Pueblo suggested the court would “tread lightly” in exercising it.
However, the third prong of Oliphant—divestiture through implication—
has been the cause of judicial mischief. For if we value clear, determinate,
and predictable rules, the Court in its application of implicit divestiture, has
been vague, indeterminate and, at times, schizophrenic.100 To the extent the
Court has been predictable, it has been suspicious of retained sovereignty.
Further, as argued herein, implicit divestiture is a mask for the exercise of
judicial de-recognition and a violation of the separation of powers.

95. Id. at 60-62.
96. Id. at 60.
97. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
98. The Court in Wheeler states that tribal sovereignty is subject to complete defeasance
by Congress, through the exercise of its plenary power. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S.
313, 323 (1978). The tension created by simultaneous assertions of inherent aboriginal
sovereignty and congressional plenary power is the subject of Justice Thomas’s repeated
calls for a reexamination of “the premises and logic of [the Court’s] tribal sovereignty
cases.” United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 214-15 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[M]uch of
the confusion reflected in our precedent arises from two largely incompatible and doubtful
assumptions. First, Congress . . . can regulate virtually every aspect of the tribes without
rendering tribal sovereignty a nullity. Second, the Indian tribes retain inherent sovereignty to
enforce their criminal laws against their own members.”) (citation omitted).
99. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 54-56 (1978).
100. “Federal Indian policy is, to say the least, schizophrenic. And this confusion
continues to infuse federal Indian law and our cases.” Lara, 541 U.S. at 219 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
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The Court expounded and continued to build the implicit divestiture
doctrine in Montana v. United States.101 There, the Court was asked to
determine whether the Crow Tribe could regulate hunting and fishing on
tracts of land located within the reservation but owned in fee simple by
non-members of the Tribe.102 In finding that the Tribe could not, the Court
further articulated the implicit divestiture doctrine by expounding upon
what it means to say a tribe’s exercise of sovereign power is “inconsistent
with its status.”103 The Court created a presumption that tribes could not
exercise sovereign regulatory powers over non-Indians unless they could
point to at least one of two exceptions. First, a tribe may regulate the
activities of non-Indians through taxation and licensing where the nonIndian has entered into a consensual relationship with the tribe such as
“commercial dealing, contracts, leases or other arrangements.”104 Second,
the tribe may exercise civil authority over non-Indians on fee lands when
their conduct “threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity,
the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”105 In creating
these two exceptions, which themselves invite a considerable degree of
discretion in their application, the Court severely curtailed tribes’ civil
sovereign power over non-Indians. The Court did not explain why noncriminal conduct by non-Indians that threatens the health or welfare of the
tribe might be subject to tribal authority, while criminal conduct by nonIndians that threatens the health or welfare of the tribe is beyond tribal
jurisdiction. Montana did in the civil sphere what Oliphant did in the
criminal sphere—create a presumption that tribal sovereignty has been
divested absent a clear affirmation from the political branches. All is lost
except that which is specifically retained.
Oliphant de-recognized a tribe’s criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians
to the point of extinction, and Montana and its progeny de-recognized a
tribe’s civil jurisdiction over non-Indians almost to the point of extinction.
In neither case did the Court engage with the recognition power and
consider whether it had constitutional authority to hold tribes divested of
sovereign powers. The question of the nature of implicit divestiture became
the subject of constitutional dialogue between the Court and Congress
101. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
102. The “checkerboard” nature of land ownership within many reservations is the result
of the allotment policy and subsequent repurchase policy of the Indian New Deal. See infra
text accompanying notes 258-62.
103. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564.
104. Id. at 565.
105. Id. at 566.
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beginning with Duro v. Reina106 in 1990, Congress’s “Duro-Fix"107 in 1990,
and United States v. Lara108 in 2004. Because this dialogue is central to
discussing a potential (but ultimately faulty) defense of implicit divestiture,
I address it in depth in Part II. The Court continued with its implicit
divestiture doctrine in its post-Lara jurisprudence.
In Strate v. A-1 Contractors, the Court held that the tribes lacked
jurisdiction over a civil tort claim between two non-Indians for a car
accident occurring on a state highway across reservation land.109 And, in
Nevada v. Hicks, the Court held that tribal courts do not have jurisdiction
over state officials for allegedly tortious acts committed on Indian land.110
In Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., the Court
applied the implicit divestiture framework, including the narrow Montana
exceptions, to hold that the sale of fee simple land on a reservation by a
non-Indian entity to another non-Indian entity was not reviewable by tribal
courts.111 The Court found that the seller of the land, a non-Indian owned
bank, had not consented to the regulatory authority of the tribe, despite
extensive contacts. Further, the Court held, the sale of fee-owned land did
not implicate the political integrity, economic security, or health and safety
of the tribe.112 Thus, neither of the two Montana exceptions to implicit
divestiture applied, and the tribe lacked sovereign power to review a
commercial real estate transaction occurring within the reservation.113 The
Court in Plains Commerce Bank specifically reinforced the judicially
created notions that, in general, the “inherent sovereign powers of an Indian
Tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the Tribe,”114 efforts
by a tribe to regulate non-members are “presumptively invalid,” and the
burden rests on the tribe to establish one of the limited Montana
exceptions.115 Plains Commerce Bank reinforces the notion that all
sovereignty is lost except that which is specifically affirmed by Congress,

106. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
107. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012).
108. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
109. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
110. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
111. 554 U.S. 316 (2008).
112. Id. at 336.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 328 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981)). In making
this assertion the Court failed to note the congressional “Duro-Fix” in which Congress
specifically affirmed a tribe’s criminal jurisdiction over Indian non-members.
115. Id. at 330 (quoting Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 659 (2001)).
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or that which falls within two very narrowly drawn and very narrowly
applied exceptions.116
C. Implicit Divestiture Is a Mask for Judicial De-Recognition
Whenever the Court issues a ruling that the tribes have been divested of
sovereign powers under implicit divestiture, it adjusts the sovereign powers
of the tribes without constitutional authorization or delegated authority
from the political branches. In the absence of treaty statements or clear
federal policy regarding the exercise of any particular sovereign power, the
Court generally presumes such powers are lost. The Court’s holdings under
implicit divestiture are acts of judicial de-recognition. The reason that the
Court’s rulings upholding tribal sovereignty in the absence of treaty
statements or clear federal policy, such as in Wheeler and Santa Clara
Pueblo, are not acts of judicial recognition is because such holdings do
nothing more than acknowledge and maintain an ancient status quo—the
particular aspects of the relationship between the tribes and the United
States that remain undisturbed, but subject to future adjustment.
Native American tribes have a unique, sui generis status in their
relationships with the United States, not identical to foreign nations and not
identical to states. Indeed, the tri-partite Commerce Clause, by which
Congress is vested with authority to regulate commerce among the states,
with foreign entities and with Indian tribes suggests this difference in
status.117 Various court decisions have described Native American tribes as
“domestic dependent nations,”118 “ward[s]” of the United States,119 “quasisovereign nations,”120 and “unique aggregations possessing attributes of
sovereignty over both their members and their territory.”121 The political
branches themselves, as will be discussed more fully herein, have adopted
similar appellations for Indian tribes. The relationship between the United
States and its tribal nations is complex, difficult, and sensitive, just as its
116. The majority in Plains Commerce even calls attention to the fact that the exceptions
are rarely held to apply on non-Indian land—seemingly to suggest how narrow the
exceptions really are—a self-fulfilling prophecy. “Tellingly, with only ‘one minor exception,
we have never upheld under Montana the extension of tribal civil authority over
nonmembers on non-Indian land.’” Id. at 333 (citation omitted).
117. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“[The Congress shall have Power] To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes . . . .”).
118. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 13 (1831).
119. Id.
120. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71 (1978).
121. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
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relationships with any number of foreign sovereigns. The Court is ill suited
to make determinations about losses of tribal sovereignty just as it is ill
suited to make determinations about the sovereign status of Taiwan or other
foreign entities.
The Court’s implicit divestiture canon demonstrates that the Court
assumes tribal sovereignty has been lost. Plains Commerce Bank is an
example of the Court interpreting congressional silence as detrimental to
tribal sovereignty. In discussing the Dawes Act of 1887,122 by which tribal
lands were allotted and sold to individuals, including non-Indians, the Court
found it implausible that Congress wanted to subject non-Indians to tribal
jurisdiction even when they purchased land falling within reservations.123
The Court based this determination on what Congress did not say in the
Act, rather than what it did say. “‘[T]here is simply no suggestion’ in the
history of the [General Allotment] Act ‘that Congress intended that nonIndians who would settle upon alienated allotted lands would be subject to
tribal regulatory authority.’”124 This is true, yet the Court offers no
explanation as to why congressional silence should be interpreted as
indicating a loss of tribal sovereignty, rather than a retention.
Plains Commerce Bank illustrates another practice contributing to the
problem—the use of the royal “we” when discussing recognition. Consider
the following short declarative sentence at the beginning of the opinion’s
analysis and all that is implied thereby: “For nearly two centuries now, we
have recognized Indian tribes as ‘distinct independent political
communities,’ . . . .”125 This sentence may be meant only to set up the rest
of the opinion, yet it starts the Court out on the wrong foot. What is meant
by “we” and what is meant by the casual use of the word “recognize?”
“We,” in this context, does not refer to the United States government as a
whole and certainly not to the executive. Rather, “we” refers to the Court.
“We, the Court,” have recognized Indian tribes as political communities.126
In one simple and seemingly uncontroversial sentence, the Court asserts a
judicial recognition power. What follows? The Court seamlessly moves
122. General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887).
123. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 337
(2008).
124. Id. (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 560 (1981)).
125. Id. at 327 (citation omitted).
126. For a critique of judicial supremacy in general, see Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme
Court 2000 Term Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001); see also KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT,
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999).
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from the assertion of a judicial recognition power to the assertion of a
judicial de-recognition power under the guise of implicit divestiture. A
better opening to the Plains Commerce Bank opinion would read something
like, “Except for the periods of allotment and termination, the United States
government for nearly two centuries has chosen to recognize Native
American sovereignty, albeit curtailed.” Such an introduction might cause
the Court to take a step back from its own involvement in the recognition
process and merely call “balls and strikes.”127
The careful language of divestiture serves as a mask for judicial derecognition in other ways. First, note the persistent use of the passive voice
when describing divestiture. For example, in Wheeler, the Court said,
“Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by
treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent
status.”128 Although we may reasonably guess who does the “withdrawing”
when divestiture occurs through treaty (executive) and statute (legislative),
the Court avoids telling us who does the “withdrawing” when divestiture
occurs through implication. And even though it may be theoretically
possible for the political branches to effectuate a change in tribal status
outside the traditional methods of treaties and legislation, it is historically
rare. In reality, the entity that “withdraws” aspects of tribal sovereignty
through implicit divestiture is the Court itself.
The language of implicit divestiture further masks recognition by
suggesting that the Court is engaging in a kind of benign and passive
constitutional analysis. To illustrate what the Court is actually doing, it is
helpful to make a comparison to foreign affairs. Occasionally, the United
States will disallow foreign sovereigns to prosecute United States citizens,
especially military personnel and contractors.129 In those cases, it would not
typically be said that the United States has divested the foreign nation of a
sovereign power. Rather, it would be more precise to say that the United
States refuses to recognize a foreign sovereign’s power to prosecute a
United States citizen. Even if the linguistic distinction is semantical, the
most important lesson from the comparison is that in foreign affairs, one or
both of the political branches make the decision to shield United States
127. See Roberts: ‘My Job Is to Call Balls and Strikes and Not to Pitch or Bat’,
CNN.COM (Sept. 12, 2005), http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/12/roberts.statement/
(statement of Chief Justice Roberts during his confirmation hearings).
128. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
129. See, e.g., Alan F. Williams, The Case for Overseas Article III Courts: The
Blackwater Effect and Criminal Accountability in the Age of Privatization, 44 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 45 (2010).
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citizens from foreign prosecution, not the judiciary. In tribal affairs, it
would be more linguistically precise to say that the United States refuses to
recognize a tribe’s authority to prosecute a non-Indian—especially a United
States citizen—rather than saying a tribe is divested or has lost that power
through implication. Such precision in language would serve to remind us
that the decision is not judicial in nature, but is the prerogative of one or
both of the political branches.
D. Problems
There are two main problems with implicit divestiture—one
constitutional and one judicial. Implicit divestiture implicates the separation
of powers. Further, the Court has not articulated clear, determinate, and
predictable rules upon which tribes, law enforcement, lower courts, and the
populace in general may reliably operate.
1. Constitutional Problems
A constitution, at its heart, is a system that allocates decision-making
power. Under the United States system, the power of interacting with
sovereign entities is vested in the federal executive, with Senate input for
particular actions like treaty making and the appointment of ambassadors.
The constellation of foreign affairs powers includes the authority to
recognize and de-recognize sovereign entities and is vested in the executive
to provide unity, clarity, and coherence. In the context of foreign affairs, the
Court has wisely avoided misappropriating the recognition power from the
legislative and executive branches. There, the Court has recognized its own
limited role, saying, “In our constitutional system, these matters are
committed to the Legislature and the Executive, not the Judiciary. . . . [T]he
Court does no more, and must do no more, than note the existence of . . .
debate and tensions . . . .”130
In the context of tribal sovereignty, the Court has adopted a different
approach, and never explained its reasoning. Implicit divestiture runs
counter to the constitutionally created process of recognition as well as derecognition—a process the Court respects in foreign affairs. In that arena,
the Court has never come close to assuming a foreign sovereign has lost or
otherwise been divested of sovereign powers in the absence of clear
statements from the political branches. And yet, with tribes, the Court has
de-recognized tribal sovereign powers by holding those ancient and preconstitutional powers no longer exist, for some reason, unless the tribes can
130. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2081 (2015).
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point to specific re-affirmations from Congress. By holding that tribes are
implicitly divested of sovereign powers, the Court de-recognizes their
sovereignty.
The Constitution does not accidentally vest the recognition power with
the executive. As even the Court has stated, following the Constitution in
this matter allows the country to speak with “one voice.”131 Implicit
divestiture has contributed to multiple voices on tribal sovereignty. Not
only has the Court contradicted the will of the political branches, the Court
lacks even internal consistency. When the recognition power of the
executive is respected, federal recognition may change with new
executives, or even during the administration of a single executive. The
nation speaks with one voice. However, by inserting itself into the decisionmaking process, the Court has created confusion. It becomes unclear as to
whether the Court will rule in favor of or against tribal sovereignty
(although the odds are against), let alone whether such a holding is
consistent with executive pronouncements.
The Court’s reasoning in Zivotofsky, as to why the recognition power
regarding foreign entities, has been constitutionally and historically vested
in the executive applies with equal force to the question of whether the
judiciary should be involved in making determinations about the loss of
sovereignty in the context of Native Americans. In Zivotofsky, the Court
based its decision not only on textual and historical grounds, but also on a
functional reading of the Constitution,132 finding that for reasons of unity
and clarity, the recognition power is vested exclusively in the executive.
“Recognition is a topic on which the Nation must ‘speak . . . with one
voice.’”133 Further, the “President is capable in ways Congress is not, of
engaging in the delicate and often secret diplomatic contacts that may lead
to a decision on recognition.”134 We might add that the judiciary is certainly
not capable of carrying on delicate diplomatic contacts with foreign nations
or Indian tribes. The Court readily acknowledges a need for delicacy and
tact in the area of foreign recognition; the Court should also acknowledge
the need for delicacy and tact in the area of tribal recognition. The Court
has, in the past forty years added its voice to that of the political branches in
tribal recognition matters, muddying the waters. There is an interesting
question left open by the Court in Zivotofsky regarding whether tribal
131. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2086.
132. Id. (stating that “functional considerations” suggest that the power is exclusive).
133. Id. (quoting Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 (2003) (alteration in
original) (second internal quotation marks omitted)).
134. Id.
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recognition is, like in foreign affairs, an exclusively executive power or
whether Congress should be involved. This Article does not seek to answer
that question. Whether it is an exclusive executive power or shared political
power, one thing it is not: a judicial power.
There are two seemingly related, but in reality, quite distinct
governmental powers regarding Native American tribal sovereignty, one of
which is appropriate for the judiciary, while the other, being an executive
(or possibly shared political) power, is not. The Court has not been careful
to distinguish between these powers, and has thus conflated them and
asserted itself inappropriately at times into political branch determinations.
The first governmental power, a judicial one, is to question the
constitutional source of federal authority to interact with the tribes, as well
as to investigate the potential status of tribal sovereignty as part of the
constitutional structure. The second governmental power is the authority to
recognize sovereigns, including domestic dependent nations. Although the
recognition power is not operable against states by virtue of their being part
of the constitutional structure, it nevertheless is a valid important
diplomatic tool in structuring the United States’ relationship with Native
American tribes. It is a power appropriately vested in Articles I and II, not
Article III.
2. Judicial Problems: A Lack of Clear, Determinate Standards
A cardinal principal of societies aspiring to be governed by the rule of
law is that the rules of law are clear, determinate, and predictable. Michalyn
Steele has called attention to the lack of clear, determinate, and predictable
rules in the application of implicit divestiture,135 and her suggestion to
replace implicit divestiture through the political question doctrine is
discussed in Part III. The Supreme Court has created, as only the Supreme
Court can do, a three-part test for determining tribal sovereign
divestiture,136 followed by the creation of two exceptions to the third prong
of the three part test,137 followed by decisions demonstrating that the two
135. Steele, supra note 20.
136. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978). (“Indian tribes still possess
those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a
necessary result of their dependent status.”).
137. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) (“A tribe may regulate, through
taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual
relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or
other arrangements. A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over
the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or
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exceptions are to be narrowly construed with the burden resting on the
tribes to show their applicability.138 The exceptions work in theory, but the
Court rarely allows them to be put into practice.
Implicit divestiture keeps everyone guessing. The stated standards are
that tribes are divested of powers “inconsistent with their status” and that
they retain regulatory powers necessary for tribal self-government,
economic well-being, and the health and safety of the tribes. And yet,
Supreme Court case law has provided no guidance as to what those lofty
phrases mean. The Court paradoxically suggests that non-Indians’ civil
activities might implicate the health and welfare of a tribe giving rise to
tribal regulatory authority, but that tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians for even murders that go federally unprosecuted. Murders
certainly implicate the health and welfare of the tribe, as do less serious
offenses. Indians and non-Indians alike struggle to know how to structure
their commercial relationships on tribal lands in the absence of predictable
rules of law. Some lower courts, as Addie Rolnick argues, have already
begun to implement a version of implicit divestiture that is less hostile to
tribal sovereignty.139 As admirable as those efforts may be, they do not
remove doubt as to whether such decisions will be overturned on appeal.
The Court should be asked to confront the constitutionality of implicit
divestiture. Given that the Court has recently thoroughly examined the
recognition power (although in a context outside of tribal sovereignty), and
given that the Court continually faces issues of tribal sovereignty, the Court
should engage in a thorough examination of the recognition power as it
pertains to tribal sovereignty. If it is true that judicial confusion follows
political branch confusion, as Justice Thomas asserts, then the appropriate
solution is to force the political branches to handle the issue by requiring
explicit statements of divestiture and assert that the Court will no longer
attempt to read congressional and executive tea leaves.140 The default
position should be that all that is not specifically surrendered is retained.
has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or
welfare of the tribe.”) (citation omitted).
138. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Montana, 450 U.S. 544.
139. See Rolnick, supra note 4, at 1646 (“More recently, though, courts have followed
the lead of tribes, scholars and advocates by employing an inside out approach to determine
the boundaries of tribal criminal jurisdiction.”).
140. This approach would be consistent with a canon of interpretation in federal Indian
law that “tribal property rights and sovereignty are preserved unless Congress’s intent to the
contrary is clear and unambiguous.” See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW §
2.02, at 114 (Nell J. Newton et al. eds., LexisNexis 2012) [hereinafter COHEN].

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

96

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

This approach would call for the reexamination of implicit divestiture cases
since Oliphant. Of course, in abandoning the implicit divestiture
framework, the Court should articulate a new (and constitutional) standard
of review for tribal sovereignty cases. One approach is suggested in Part III.
Before discussing that approach, though, it is necessary to address the
potential justifications of implicit divestiture.
III. Potential Justifications of Implicit Divestiture Are Unavailing
The Court has not clearly characterized or justified its actions under
implicit divestiture. Rather, it has proceeded without a thorough
investigation of not only the recognition power, but of its own judicial
authority to engage in acts of divestiture. There are three potential
justifications for the Court’s actions: (1) rulings under implicit divestiture
are appropriate for the judiciary because they are constitutional in nature—
that is, they regulate the boundaries among sovereigns; (2) rulings under
implicit divestiture are appropriate exercises of federal common law,
subject to congressional or executive override; (3) rulings under implicit
divestiture are appropriate because they merely implement federal policy.
This Part will address each of these potential justifications in turn to
demonstrate why they are unconvincing.
Before doing so, however, a little bit of history is necessary. Despite the
ambiguity in the nature of its doctrine, the Court routinely examines Native
American legal history for purposes of ascertaining the historical
“dependent status” of the tribes. Each of the potential justifications for
implicit divestiture relies heavily on the historical record and thus a sound
understanding of that history is necessary to discuss them and understand
why they each fail. Because the historical record speaks to all three
potential justifications, I first offer a brief review of Native American legal
history as refracted through the lens of recognition, with particular attention
to the Act of 1871 by which Congress announced a new policy to
discontinue the practice of treaty making with the tribes. Some scholars and
judges, including Justice Thomas, treat this statute as a sovereignty Rubicon
upon the passing of which, they allege, tribal sovereignty suffered a fatal
blow, either as a matter of constitutional law or due to changed federal
policy.141 Having discussed the historical record, I will then turn to the three
141. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 215 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I
would ascribe much more significance to legislation such as the Act of Mar. 3, 1871 . . . .”).
Some scholars, though sympathetic to the theory of “treaty-substitutes,” discussed herein,
nevertheless suggest a return to a treaty-making process would bolster tribal sovereignty,
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justifications mentioned above. I will also address, at the end of the Part,
Justice Thomas’s larger theoretical concerns with Native American
sovereignty jurisprudence.
A. Native American Tribal Recognition – Some History
1. Institutional Engagement Until the Mid-Nineteenth Century
From the colonial period to 1871, Anglo-American governments
interacted with Native American tribes generally on a nation-to-nation
basis. English colonial governments recognized the sovereignty of Native
American tribes and negotiated directly with them without much colonial
coordination.142 Global conflict prompted a British reevaluation of the
Empire’s institutional engagement with North American Indians and,
during the French and Indian War, the Crown created two departments of
Indian affairs in North America, one for the northern colonies and one for
the southern colonies, and appointed commissioners for each.143 After the
war, the Crown formulated a unitary policy toward Native Americans; such
singularity was expressed in British Peace Treaties with the Iroquois in
1768 and the Proclamation of 1763.
underscoring the importance of the Act of 1871. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, (Native)
American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 431, 489 (2005); Hope
Babcock, A Possible Solution to the Problem of Diminishing Tribal Sovereignty, 90 N.D. L.
REV. 13 (2014); DELORIA & WILKINS, supra note 23, at 161 (“[I]t is long overdue that the
federal government once again restrict itself to the exercise of the only clear traditional
manner of dealing with Indian tribes — the treaty relationship.”).
142. See ERIC FONER, GIVE ME LIBERTY 55 (3d ed. 2012). Despite their common
allegiance to the Crown, colonial officials were free to formulate policies for their colonies
that might differ from one another. As Mary Sarah Bilder has shown, the British Empire’s
approach to colonial law allowed for legal divergence in the colonies from standards in the
motherland, but not repugnance. See MARY SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC
CONSTITUTION: COLONIAL LEGAL CULTURE AND THE EMPIRE (2004). For example, the
governments of Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania entered into the Treaty of Lancaster
with the Haudenosaunee Confederacy in 1744. FRANCIS JENNINGS, THE AMBIGUOUS
IROQUOIS EMPIRE: THE COVENANT CHAIN CONFEDERATION OF INDIAN TRIBES WITH ENGLISH
COLONIES FROM ITS BEGINNINGS TO THE LANCASTER TREATY OF 1744 (1984). New York was
not party to the Treaty of Lancaster, even though it had been party to the Treaty of Albany in
1722 with the same tribal nations. With continuing land disputes between Native Americans
and Anglo settlers following the Treaty of Lancaster, Virginia re-negotiated with the Six
Nations, and concluded the Treaty of Logstown in 1752, but without representation from
previous participants Maryland and Pennsylvania. JAYME A. SOKOLOW, THE GREAT
ENCOUNTER: NATIVE PEOPLES AND EUROPEAN SETTLERS IN THE AMERICAS 206 (2003).
143. See WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, THE INDIAN IN AMERICA 95 (Henry S. Commager &
Richard B. Morris eds., 1975).
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Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress asserted federal primacy
in dealing with the tribes, but without real power to prevent the states from
formulating their own policies.144 Following the Revolutionary War,
Congress maintained the offices of Superintendents for Indian Affairs
within the War Department, and continued to negotiate with the tribes
through a treaty-making process.145 The Northwest Ordinance, passed by
Congress in 1787 while the Constitutional Convention was meeting, and
reauthorized by the first Congress under the Constitution in 1789, likewise
enshrined high ideals for the treatment of Native tribes into law:
The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the
Indians, their lands and property shall never be taken from them
without their consent; and, in their property, rights and liberty,
they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and
lawful wars authorised by Congress; but laws founded in justice
and humanity, shall from time to time be made for preventing
wrongs being done to them, and for preserving peace and
friendship with them.146
Despite the fact that the new nation consistently acted contrary to the ideals
of the Northwest Ordinance, the notion that the United States should deal
with tribes as sovereign entities and respect their sovereign powers was
nevertheless written into American law from its founding.
Absent, of course, from the Constitutional Convention, were
representatives of tribes. This is not to say Indians were not on the minds of
144. Prior to the Declaration of Independence, but after fighting between British forces
and revolutionaries had already begun, the Continental Congress created three geographical
departments for Indian Affairs, patterned after the Crown’s system, and appointed
commissioners for each department including, among others, Benjamin Franklin and Patrick
Henry. JAMES H. O'DONNELL III, SOUTHERN INDIANS IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 23
(1973). The commissioners’ immediate duty was to negotiate with various Indian tribes to
procure their neutrality during the Revolutionary War. Congress even drafted a speech for
the Commissioners: “This is a family quarrel between us and Old England. You Indians are
not concerned in it. We don't wish you to take up the hatchet against the king's troops. We
desire you to remain at home, and not join either side, but keep the hatchet buried deep.” Id.
145. See CARL WALDMAN, ATLAS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN INDIAN 236 (3d ed. 2009).
Congress instructed superintendents of Indian Affairs to “maintain a constant friendly
correspondence with the chiefs of the several nations within [their] district” and hold several
“general and particular treaties from time to time.” U.S. War Office, Instructions to
Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Department 1 (1787), https://www.loc.gov/
resource/bdsdcc.21401/?st=gallery.
146. Northwest Ordinance of 1787 art. III, reprinted in 32 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 340 (Roscoe R. Hill ed., 1936).
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the Framers. The Constitution of 1787 sought to address perceived defects
relating to the United States’ relationship with tribes under the Articles,
including the threat tribes posed to the United States militarily as well as
the lack of coherence and unity in negotiating with tribes.147 The
Constitution explicitly mentions “Indians” or “Indian Tribes” in two places.
First, Article I, Section 2 excludes “Indians not taxed” from the population
when counting persons for purposes of determining representation.148 The
second, in Article I, Section 8, grants to Congress the power to regulate
Commerce “with the Indian Tribes.”149 The “Indians not taxed” clause is a
constitutional acknowledgment that Native American tribes owed
allegiance to a sovereign other than the United States and its several states.
The Indian Commerce Clause is a more explicit constitutional
acknowledgment of tribal entities. As we shall see, the executive treatymaking power in Article II, Section 2, though not explicitly mentioning
tribal nations, also played an important role in federal and tribal relations
from the founding until 1871.
Congress’s Commerce Clause power relates to three entities: foreign
nations, the states, and Indian tribes. While Congress has power to regulate
commerce “among” the states, it has power to regulate commerce “with”
foreign nations and Indian tribes. Read together, this tri-partite Commerce
Clause suggests two things: (1) that the three entities mentioned have
degrees of sovereignty; and (2) that Indian tribes do not, according to the
Constitution, square neatly with either foreign nations or states.150
The first U.S. Congress placed Native American relations within the War
Department, where it had resided under the Articles of Confederation and
where it would remain until the creation of the Department of the Interior in
1849.151 The Bureau of Indian Affairs would later take on a more important
147. See Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, 63 DUKE L.J. 999 (2014).
148. U.S. CONST. art I, § 2. This phrase was repeated in the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Apportionment clause. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
149. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
150. Alex Tallchief Skibine argues that even if the Constitution does not guarantee tribal
sovereignty, it acknowledges it. See Skibine, supra note 4, at 80 (“Although the sovereignty
of Indian tribes may not be guaranteed or defined in the Constitution, this does not mean that
the tribes have no constitutional status.”).
151. See CARL WALDMAN, ATLAS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN INDIAN 236 (3d ed. 2009). In
1806, Congress created the Office of Indian Trade within the War Department, which was
charged with maintaining a trading post network for trading with Native Americans. In
1824, without authorization from Congress, Secretary of War John Calhoun created the
Bureau of Indian Affairs within his department. Congress later formally established an office
of Indian Affairs in 1832, whose office and officers remained located in the War Department
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and outsized role in the formulation of Indian policy in the latter half of the
nineteenth century, continuing well into the twentieth century. However, in
the early Republic, Congress aggressively asserted itself in the devising of
Indian policy, and executive interaction with tribes occurred mainly outside
of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.152 Beginning with its first session, Congress
repeatedly passed Indian Non-Intercourse Acts primarily aimed at codifying
the inalienability of tribal lands and establishing federal primacy over the
states in interacting with tribes.153 The Acts prevented the sale or grant of
tribal lands to anyone without approval from the national government.154
The Acts were aimed, in part, to preserve tribal sovereignty by ensuring that
tribal territory remained intact.155 However, such acts were a two-edged
sword for sovereignty because not only did they establish federal primacy
over the states, they also established federal primacy over the tribes. In
disallowing the private sale of traditional tribal lands, the federal
government assumed the power to determine the boundaries of tribal lands.
Thus Congress, at the founding, simultaneously recognized and curtailed
tribal sovereignty. This dual role of the federal government—conqueror and
self-proclaimed protectorate of tribal sovereigns—persists to the present.
Congress passed the Indian Removal Act in 1830, signed into law by
President Andrew Jackson.156 The Act was the culmination of lengthy
dialogue between southern states and the federal government. Acculturation
until 1849 when the Department of the Interior was created. See STEPHEN J. ROCKWELL,
INDIAN AFFAIRS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 78, 247
(2010).
152. Congress, however, did not dominate federal Indian policy at the founding. Indeed,
it is arguable that a vigorous executive branch under George Washington set the agenda. See,
e.g., Greg Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012 (2015).
153. See COHEN, supra note 140, § 1.03, at 35.
154. Whereas early iterations of the law contained statutory expiration dates, the NonIntercourse Act of 1834 was permanent and remains codified. See 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2012).
155. George Washington told the Seneca after passage of the Non-Intercourse Act of
1790, “Here then is the security for the remainder of your lands . . . . The general
government will never consent to your being defrauded. But it will protect you in all your
just rights.” Reply of George Washington to the Seneca Chiefs (Dec. 29, 1790), reprinted in
7 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 146-50 (Jack D. Warren, Jr.
ed., 1998). “The [Indian Non-Intercourse Act] . . . embodies the policy of the United States
to acknowledge and guarantee the Indian tribes' right of occupancy of tribal lands and to
prevent the tribes from disposing of their land improvidently.” Narragansett Indian Tribe of
Rhode Island v. Rhode Island, 296 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D.R.I. 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
407 F.3d 450 (1st Cir. 2005), vacated en banc, 415 F.3d 134 (1st Cir. 2005), on reh’g, 449
F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1053 (2006).
156. Ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411.
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policies set in place during Washington’s administration remained the
official policy of the federal government until the Age of Jackson.157
Acculturation, according to Christian Keller, was the policy by which the
federal government recognized tribal sovereignty and self-government east
of the Mississippi River conditioned upon the tribes adopting Anglo
behaviors in government, industry and religion.158 However, since at least
the Jefferson administration, if not earlier, southern states, particularly
Georgia, agitated for removal policies that would allow them to control
tribal lands.159 Meeting with some federal resistance to the idea, and being
impatient, Georgia began removing Native Americans without federal
authorization.160 Continued federal policy asserting primacy over states
with respect to Native Americans demanded that the federal government
act. Congress did not simply order the military removal of Native
Americans without a pretense of negotiation. Rather, it passed the Removal
Act, set aside federal land west of the Mississippi River, and authorized the
President to negotiate land exchanges with the southeastern tribes.161 Such
land exchanges were made through treaties. To be sure removal would
occur, the removal treaties were negotiated at the end of a rifle—offers the
tribes could not refuse—but the federal government at least paid lip service
to tribal sovereignty by going through the motions of negotiating with the
tribes on a nation-to-nation basis. In these actions, the United States
continued to recognize the tribes’ sovereignty, even as it was exercising
military dominance over them.162
157. For a discussion of the shift from policies of acculturation to those of removal, see
Christian Keller, Philanthropy Betrayed: Thomas Jefferson, the Louisiana Purchase, and the
Origins of Federal Indian Removal Policy, 144 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 39 (2000).
158. Id. at 45.
159. Id. at 54-55.
160. Id. at 55.
161. Indian Removal Act of 1830, §§ 1-2, 4 Stat. at 411-12.
162. Two interpretations of the actions of Jackson and Congress are generally offered,
and they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The first posits that Jackson was acting in
concert with the south to deprive Native Americans of their territorial sovereignty to enrich
Anglo-Americans. The second, more charitable interpretation of Jackson’s actions, as put
forth by Robert Remini, was that there was tension between the federal government and
southern states and Jackson, recognizing that tribal sovereignty would be completely lost
through acculturation in the states, genuinely thought the best way to protect tribal
sovereignty was to remove the Indians from states into federal territory where the federal
government would be on more solid legal and literal ground to serve as “guardians” of their
“ward.” That is, the federal government could hold vast lands in trust for Native Americans,
thereby protecting their sovereignty. In either case, though, Jackson and Congress at least
acknowledged theoretical tribal sovereignty by negotiating removal treaties either under
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Against this backdrop of removal, the Supreme Court first fully entered
the fray of Native American sovereignty. In three seminal cases now
referred to as the Marshall Trilogy, the Court struggled to find where in the
American constitutional system Native Indians fit.163 Given the continued
precedential value of the Marshall Trilogy, and the enduring
characterization found therein, for better or worse, of Native American
tribes as “domestic dependent nations,” the Trilogy is well-trod scholarly
ground.164 The brief review here is limited to analyzing the Marshall
Trilogy through the lens of the recognition power.
The first of the Trilogy, Johnson v. M’Intosh,165 had its roots in Fletcher
v. Peck.166 In Fletcher, the Court entertained the theory that tribes did not
occupy tribal lands in fee simple,167 an idea that found full expression in
M’Intosh thirteen years later. There, the Court held Native American tribal
land to be inalienable—unless the sale was accompanied by the approval of
the federal government.168 Though not basing its ruling on the NonIntercourse Acts, the Court nevertheless reinforced the policy behind them
by acknowledging tribal sovereignty while simultaneously curtailing it, in
the service of establishing the primacy of federal law over state common
law.169 The roots of the Federal-Native American Trust Relationship
regarding real property are found in M’Intosh. “All our institutions
recognize the absolute title of the crown, subject only to the Indian right of
occupancy, . . . [which is] incompatible with an absolute and complete title
in the Indians.”170 Marshall appealed to the law of nations to reach his
ruling, which “laws” recognized an almost unfettered right in the Crown
(and its American successor) to control indigenously occupied land.171

threat of force or after force had already been implemented. See 2 ROBERT V. REMINI,
ANDREW JACKSON AND THE COURSE OF AMERICAN FREEDOM, 1822-1832 (1981).
163. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
164. See, e.g., Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the Marshall Trilogy, 82 N.D. L.
REV. 627 (2006); Ann E. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots Between the Constitution, the
Marshall Trilogy, and United States v. Lara: Notes Toward a Blueprint for the Next
Legislative Restoration of Tribal Sovereignty, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 651 (2009).
165. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543.
166. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
167. Id. at 117-19.
168. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 587.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 588.
171. Id. at 574.
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In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,172 the Court held that the Cherokee
Nation did not have standing to sue in federal court to challenge Georgia’s
incursions into its sovereignty, as it was not a state and not a foreign
sovereign.173 It is in this case that Marshall first referred to Native tribes as
“domestic dependent nations,” as well as a “ward” in need of a
“guardian”174—characterizations that have permeated federal Indian law to
the present. Cherokee Nation was a fractured opinion, with Justice Joseph
Story—who would have granted standing to the tribe and heard the case on
the merits—joining the dissent.175 Story later privately expressed his
satisfaction that some of the negative implications of Cherokee Nation were
effectively overruled the following year in Worcester v. Georgia,176
exclaiming, “Thanks be to God . . . the Court can wash their hands clean of
the iniquity of oppressing the Indians and disregarding their rights.”177
The State of Georgia had detained a Christian minister, Samuel
Worcester, for proselyting to the Cherokee without a state-issued license.178
Worcester challenged his detention in federal court.179 The Court held that
the State of Georgia could not interfere with Worcester’s activities on the
basis that the tribes were considered, under the Constitution and in treaties,
as separate, distinct communities.180 While protecting the tribes from state
intrusion, the seeds of federal plenary power remained undisturbed. In
Worcester, the Court did not issue orders to the federal government, but did
order Georgia to release Worcester.181 Georgia dragged its feet and Jackson
helped little. Ultimately, Georgia relented, owing less to the Court’s order
than to political sentiment in Georgia itself. The immediate effect of the
Worcester opinion was limited; federal removal policies continued
172. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
173. Id. at 20.
174. Id. at 17.
175. Id. at 34 (Thompson, J., joined by Story, J., dissenting).
176. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
177. R. KENT NEWMEYER, JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBLIC
215-16 (1985). Whatever the deficiencies of M’Intosh and Cherokee Nation, one might still
sympathize with John Marshall, whose practice was to avoid a constitutional showdown and
preserve the viability of the judiciary in national affairs. Had the Court granted the Cherokee
Nation standing and ruled in its favor, Marshall would be in the position of issuing an order
to either the State of Georgia or the federal executive, or both. Marshall, who recognized the
futility of issuing a writ of mandamus to Thomas Jefferson almost thirty years earlier, would
have certainly recognized the futility of issuing a writ of mandamus to Andrew Jackson.
178. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 538.
179. Id. at 537-38.
180. Id. at 559.
181. Id. at 562.
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unabated and more than 4000 Native Americans lost their lives along the
Trail of Tears.182 Nevertheless, Marshall embedded a principle of retained
sovereignty into the constitutional framework. Tribes retained theoretical
sovereignty if they had not surrendered it via treaty. Such sovereignty
received constitutional protection from state incursions. However, the
question of federal power to disrupt sovereignty came to the fore in the
latter half of the nineteenth century.
2. Tribal Recognition – Mid to Late Nineteenth Century
The idea of a separate Department of the Interior long preceded the
Mexican-American War, but did not get off the ground until the United
States acquired 529,000 additional square miles from Mexico as part of the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.183 As the nation expanded its borders to the
Pacific, a reevaluation of Indian policy became necessary. Having pushed
tribal nations continually west, the nation began to run out of an
unorganized “West.” Robert Walker, President James K. Polk’s Treasury
Secretary, drafted a bill to create a Department of the Interior and
shepherded it through Congress.184 Over the objections of John C. Calhoun,
Congress created the Department the day before Polk left office and moved
the Bureau of Indian Affairs there.185
The transfer of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) to the Department of
the Interior marked a shift in the bureaucratic treatment of tribal nations.
While the United States continued to negotiate with tribes through the
treaty-making process until 1871, and although the United States Army
continued to “assist” in the realm of Indian affairs, the transfer denoted that
tribal relations became less a matter of foreign affairs and more a matter of
domestic concern, involving subjects, if not citizens, of the United States.
Just two years following the creation of the Department of the Interior,
Congress began creating the reservation system. It did so by allocating
funds for reservations in the Indian Appropriation Bill of 1851.186 Tensions
between Trans-Mississippi whites and Native Americans, including those
182. Ronald N. Satz, The Cherokee Trail of Tears: A Sesquicentennial Perspective, 73
GA. HIST. Q. 431 (1989).
183. See Henry Barrett Learned, The Establishment of the Secretaryship of the Interior,
16 AM. HIST. REV. 751, 751 (1911).
184. Id. at 763-71.
185. See 26 THE PAPERS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN: 1848-1849, at 337 (Clyde N. Wilson,
Shirley B. Cook & Alexander Moore eds., 2003); see also Debate of Mar. 3, 1849, CONG.
GLOBE 30th Cong., 2nd Sess. 666 (1849).
186. Ch. 14, 9 Stat. 574, 586-87.
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who forced from the southeast on the Trail of Tears led to the creation of
reservations in Oklahoma, to be followed elsewhere.187 As with removal,
the charitable interpretation of the creation of reservations was that the
federal government acted with paternalistic regard for the integrity of
Native American sovereignty. Commissioner of Indian Affairs Orlando
Brown explained the rationale of the reservation system as designed to
create well-defined boundaries that could be policed by the federal
government.188 In reality though, under the reservation system the policies
of removal and acculturation were combined, while tribal sovereignty
received continued recognition, albeit increasingly curtailed. No longer
charged with merely administering a network of trade with the tribes, the
BIA began administering the reservation system.189 The BIA took on a new
direction, becoming more aggressive in advocating a particular kind of
Indian policy—one hostile to tribal sovereignty.190 Supreme Court case law
from the late nineteenth century reflects then extant BIA policy and
continues to hold precedential value today.191
3. The Act of 1871
Following the Civil War, Congress turned its attention more fully to the
West.192 In an effort to protect overland trade routes, especially railroads,
and to avoid the high cost of protecting western settlements militarily, 193
Congress sought to establish peace with and among Plains Indians. In July
1867, Congress passed a bill authorizing the creation of a seven-man
187. See WASHBURN, supra note 143, at 192.
188. Id. at 191-92.
189. Id.
190. Sidney Harring states that the BIA engaged in a sustained and systematic effort to
extend U.S. criminal jurisdiction into Indian Country. See SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG’S
CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 115 (1994). For a summary of critiques against the BIA, see Robert
McCarthy, The Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Federal Trust Obligation to American
Indians, 19 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 1 (2004).
191. See Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S.
375 (1886).
192. HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, WEST FROM APPOMATTOX: THE RECONSTRUCTION OF
AMERICA AFTER THE CIVIL WAR (2007).
193. Lt. Gen. William T. Sherman, one of the commissioners charged with negotiating
the treaties of 1867, wrote to the Secretary of War that “if fifty Indians are allowed to remain
between the Arkansas and Platte we will have to guard every stage station, every train, and
all railroad working patties. In other words, fifty hostile Indians will checkmate three
thousand soldiers.” Quoted in Letter to the Secretary of the Interior from N. G. Taylor,
Commissioner (July 12, 1867), reprinted in S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 40-13, at 1, 4 (1867).
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commission with the express aim of accomplishing these goals.194 Congress
instructed the commission to select two new sites for reservations and
persuade Indians to abandon their nomadic life in exchange for agricultural
pursuits.195 Should the commissioners fail to achieve peace, the bill
authorized the Secretary of War to raise an army to accomplish the tasks
through force.196 Thus, the “Peace” Commission carried with it the threat of
forced removal. The Peace Commission succeeded in making new treaties
with twenty tribes.197
In exchange for relocation to reservations, the United States promised
homes, schoolhouses, churches, teachers, agriculture implements, livestock
and other buildings and tools, so that the reservations might become
“crucibles of assimilation.”198 Although the Senate ratified the treaties, the
House of Representatives resented being locked out of the process because
the agreements contained many expenditure decisions that included
provisions to transfer land taken from tribes directly to railroads and other
private interests.199 The selection of railroad locations continued to be a
source of high stakes congressional debate, negotiation and compromise.200
Francis A. Walker, who served as Commissioner of Indian Affairs from
1871 to 1872, described that the House of Representatives had a “growing
jealousy” toward the Senate who obligated the House to fund treatyprovisions “without inquiry.”201 Even as early as 1867, the House of
Representatives had expressed its discontent with having to fulfill treaty
obligations without being able to offer input on ratification. The House
managed to insert a provision into an appropriations act purporting to repeal
194. Kerry R. Oman, The Beginning Of The End: The Indian Peace Commission of 18671868, 22 GREAT PLAINS Q. 35, 37 (2002), http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/greatplains
quarterly/2353.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 35.
198. Bethany R. Berger, Birthright Citizenship on Trial: Elk v. Wilkins and United
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1185, 1201 (2016); see also George William
Rice, Note, Indian Rights: 25 U.S.C. Sec. 71: The End of Indian Sovereignty or a SelfLimitation of Contractual Ability?, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 239, 240 (1977).
199. Berger, supra note 198, at 1200-01.
200. The location of the transcontinental railroad was at the heart of the Kansas-Nebraska
Act of 1854, by which Stephen Douglas procured southern support for a northern route by
allowing the question of slavery in the newly organized territories to be determined by
popular sovereignty. See, e.g., NICOLE ETCHESON, BLEEDING KANSAS: CONTESTED LIBERTY
IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA 9-28 (2004).
201. FRANCIS WALKER, THE INDIAN QUESTION 5, 11-12 (1874), quoted in FELIX COHEN'S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 67 (Univ. of N.M. Press photo. reprint 1971) (1942).
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“all laws allowing the President, the Secretary of the Interior, or the
commissioner of Indian affairs to enter into treaties with any Indian
tribes . . . .”202 The constitutionality of this Act was never put before the
courts. The Act was repealed a few months later, perhaps because Congress
realized that the law allowing the President to enter into treaties—the law it
sought to repeal—is in Article II of the Constitution.203
Due to the new treaties of 1867, an intra-branch debate between the two
houses of Congress was re-ignited over the appropriate role of the House in
negotiations with Native Tribes.204 In 1869, the House flatly refused to
appropriate funds to fulfill the new treaty obligations, to the embarrassment
of the executive.205 When the next session of Congress convened, the House
relented but insisted on including a provision that “nothing in this act . . .
shall be so construed as to ratify or approve any treaty made with any
tribes, bands, or parties of Indians.”206 The Senate had already ratified the
treaties, so the provision was not binding, but expressed the sentiment of
the House.207
In 1871, when the two chambers were again deadlocked, the House
renewed the tactic it had previously used to assert its role in Indian affairs
by invoking its appropriation authority in the Constitution.208 The
appropriations bill, passed by the Senate, came back from the conference
committee with the following proviso:
Provided, That hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the
territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or
recognized as an independent nation, tribe or power with whom
the United States may contract by treaty: Provided further, that
nothing herein contained shall be construed to invalidate or
impair the obligation of any treaty heretofore lawfully made and
ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe.209
202. Act of Mar. 20, 1867, ch. 13, § 6, 15 Stat. 7. Congressional records do not reveal
discussion on congressional authority to “repeal” Article II of the Constitution. The Act of
1871 adopted a more measured approach in its attempt to insert Congress more fully into
recognition and treaty-making powers.
203. See Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 16, § 5, 15 Stat. 13, 40.
204. Clinton, supra note 21, at 167; see also Rice, supra note 198, at 240.
205. ROBERT M. UTLEY, FRONTIER REGULARS: THE UNITED STATES ARMY AND THE
INDIAN, 1866-1891, at 215 n.4 (1979).
206. Act of Apr. 10, 1869, § 5, 15 Stat. at 40.
207. See LAURENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER, OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 56-58 (1927).
208. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
209. 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2012).
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Senator Garrett Davis of Kentucky strenuously objected to the provision on
constitutional grounds.210 He viewed it as an inappropriate intrusion into the
presidential power to “determine what tribes of Indians he will make
treaties with, and what he will not.”211 However, Senator James Harlan,
former Secretary of the Interior, argued that the bill in effect did nothing
more than allow the House to participate in decisions “usually effected by
the stipulations of treaties.”212 Specifically, he pointed to a bill passed the
previous year authorizing the sale of Indian lands “with the consent of the
Indians, under a contract to be made with them by the President.”213 Senator
Harlan’s characterization of the statute is not one of ordinary legislation for
Indians, but one of the House’s involvement in the process of contracting
agreements with Indian tribes. Over the objections of Senator Davis, and at
the prodding of President Grant, who was anxious to fulfill the treaty
obligations, the Senate approved the bill. From that point forward, the
United States ceased treaty negotiations with Native tribes, although it has
continued to honor some pre-1871 treaties while abrogating others.214
Senator Harlan’s statement in support of the constitutionality of the
statute (the Act of 1871)—that it merely reorganized the manner in which
the United States entered into agreements with Native American tribes qua
tribes—is an early allusion to treaty-substitutes. “Treaty-substitutes” is the
phrase that has come to denote those agreements between sovereign entities
that do not use the traditional and formal language and procedures of
treaties, but nevertheless recognize negotiations and agreements between
sovereigns, particularly between the United States and Native American
tribes.215
210. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3rd Sess. 1822 (1871).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), the Supreme Court held that
Congress could unilaterally abrogate treaties with Native American tribes under a theory of
plenary power.
215. G. William Rice, Francis Paul Prucha, and others have discussed the use of treatysubstitutes in Native American affairs. See Rice, supra note 198, at 247; see also FRANCIS
PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL ANOMALY 173,
233 (1994). Outside the context of Native American sovereignty, the United States uses a
treaty-substitute process in its dealings with Taiwan. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations
Act, creating a conduit for diplomatic relations between the United States and Taiwan
outside PRC channels. Pub. L. No. 96–8, 93 Stat. 14 (1979). The Taiwan Relations Act was
signed into law by President Carter, who had also unilaterally abrogated the Sino-American
Mutual Defense Act. The United States and Taiwan conduct bilateral talks and enter into
direct agreements. On December 16, 2015, the Obama administration announced a deal to
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What is the legal effect of the Act of 1871? There are at least two
competing interpretations:(1) that the statute de-recognizes the sovereignty
of Indian tribes and nations, effectively announcing their complete conquest
and assimilation, rendering them subject to full legislative power of the
federal government;216 and (2) that the statute does not de-recognize their
status as sovereign nation, but merely alters the method of “ratifying”
agreements with them.217 The historical record reveals that the political
branches continued to recognize tribal sovereignty and continued to
negotiate bilateral and multilateral agreements with the tribes after 1871,
with some notable exceptions. The Court, for its part, did not interpret the
Act of 1871 as a sovereignty Rubicon prior to the rise of implicit
divestiture.
4. Early Interpretations of the Act of 1871 (1872-1884)
The year following the Act of 1871, in Holden v. Joy, the Supreme Court
was called upon to determine the status of the Cherokee Nation in a
property dispute involving former Cherokee lands.218 After citing the Act of
1871, the Court stated,
Indian tribes are States in a certain sense, though not foreign
States, or States of the United States . . . [A]cts of our
government, both in the executive and legislative departments,
plainly recognize such tribes or nations as States, and the courts
of the United States are bound by those acts.219
This language echoed the language used by Senator Eugene Casserly during
the debate over passage of the Act. Senator Casserly said that an Indian
tribe is

sell $1.83 billion worth of arms to the ROC Armed Forces, a year and eight months after the
U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act Affirmation and Naval Vessel Transfer Act
of 2014 to allow for the sale. See David Brunnstrom & Arshad Mohammed, U.S. Plans to
Sell Taiwan About $1.42 Billion in Arms, REUTERS (June 29, 2017, 3:35 PM), https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-usa-taiwan-arms/u-s-plans-to-sell-taiwan-about-1-42-billion-in-armsidUSKBN19K2XO; Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-276, § 102, 128
Stat. 2989, 2989 (2014). The deal would include the sale of two decommissioned U.S. Navy
frigates, anti-tank missiles, Assault Amphibious Vehicles, and FIM-92 Stinger surface-to-air
missiles. See Brunnstrom & Mohammed, supra.
216. Rice, supra note 198, at 240-41.
217. Id. at 241.
218. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211 (1872).
219. Id. at 242.
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like a State under a protectorate, a State quasi independent,
having certain distinct and separate rights and yet subject to the
control of another State. . . . It is not easy to define expressly
their political relation to the United States . . . more independent
than the States, less independent than foreign nations.220
The Court’s early judicial interpretation of the Act of 1871 indicates that it
did not believe the political branches had fully de-recognized the sovereign
status of tribes and nations.
The Court encountered another chance to consider the meaning of the
Act of 1871 in Elk v. Wilkins, decided in 1884.221 John Elk, a Winnebago
Indian, petitioned the Court to declare him a United States citizen by reason
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause and his voluntary
separation from his tribe.222 The Court denied his claim, finding that Indians
born of tribes or nations were not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United
States at birth, and were therefore excluded from citizenship without
naturalization, the only other avenue to citizenship.223 When analyzing the
Act of 1871, the Court stated that its “utmost possible effect [was] to
require Indian tribes be dealt with for the future through the legislative and
not the treaty-making power.”224 Although the phrase “dealt with” is itself
ambiguous, the Court’s holding that Elk was not subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States only makes sense if there remained continued
recognition of tribal sovereignty after 1871. Had the tribes been derecognized by the statute, the Court would have had to hold John Elk was
now a citizen of the United States and his respective state. But the Court did
not do so. Even as late as 1896, well into the Allotment Era, the Court held
the Fifth Amendment had no operation within tribal courts on the basis that
Constitutional due process protections did not extend to pre-existing
sovereigns.225 Thus, the effect of the Act of 1871, in its early
interpretations, was not a wholesale de-recognition of tribal sovereignty;
rather, it marked a change in the method of federal agreements made with
Indian tribes (from treaty making and ratification) to legislative approval.
G. William Rice argues that Elk v. Wilkins is a “definitive statement that the
220. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3rd Sess. 1824 (1871).
221. 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
222. Id. at 95.
223. Id. at 109; see Berger, supra note 198, at 1197 (arguing the holding in Elk v. Wilkins
was consistent with the desires of certain framers of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect
Native Sovereignty by excluding Indians from application of the Citizenship Clause).
224. Elk, 112 U.S. at 107.
225. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
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utmost effect of the statute was a change in the method of the United States’
ratification of an agreement between two international bodies politic.”226
In the 1870s and early 1880s, the Supreme Court continued to interpret
the relationship between the United States and the tribes as one of
sovereign-to-sovereign, though not equal sovereigns. Did the political
branches agree? Congress continued to appropriate money for Indian
affairs. In 1876, in an appropriation act, Congress included a proviso that
no further monies would be appropriated for the Sioux until the Sioux
entered into an agreement with the President for the cession of the Black
Hills.227 If the Sioux lacked sovereignty after 1871, there would have been
no need for Congress or the President to insist on their agreement, extorted
as it may have been, to cede the Black Hills.
5. Allotment and Assimilation
Although the Act of 1871 caused no immediate change in the United
States’ relations with the tribes, two pieces of congressional legislation in
the 1880s brought federal plenary power down from the realm of theory to
actuality. Beginning with the Major Crimes Act of 1885,228 the United
States entered into a new era of federal-tribal relations. For the first time,
Congress sought to legislate on Indian-on-Indian crime within Indian
Country, and laid the groundwork for the first of two concerted efforts by
the political branches to de-recognize tribes.
Prior to the Civil War, the BIA assisted with removal and early
reservation systems. Following the Civil War, the BIA aggressively sought
to fully assimilate Native Americans. According to Sidney Harring, the BIA
formulated an assimilationist policy and then pushed that policy on
Congress, rather than the other way around.229 Part of that effort was to
extend criminal jurisdiction over Native Americans, either at the federal
level or the state level.230 Meeting resistance at both levels, the BIA
deliberately sought a test case by which it could either judicially establish
the federal power to prosecute or, if denied, publicize, sensationalize and
use it as “Exhibit A” in asking Congress for explicit criminal jurisdiction in
226. Rice, supra note 198, at 241.
227. Act of Aug. 15, 1876, ch. 280, 19 Stat. 176, 192.
228. Ch. 341, 23 Stat. 385 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153).
229. HARRING, supra note 190, at 134, 135-36 (“Since 1874, the BIA had been
attempting to persuade Congress to extend federal jurisdiction over certain serious
crimes . . . . The Senate had rejected the BIA’s original 1874 proposal for a major crimes act
because such legislation was inconsistent with existing notions of tribal sovereignty.”).
230. Id. at 134.
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Indian Territory.231 The BIA found such a case in Ex parte Crow Dog,232 in
which the Supreme Court declined to extend federal criminal jurisdiction in
Indian Territory for Indian-on-Indian crime in the face of ambiguous treaty
provisions.233 The Court’s decision in Crow Dog was one of judicial
minimalism and pragmatism, refusing to divest the tribes of exclusive
criminal jurisdiction when confronted with contradictory and unclear
federal law.234 At the instigation of the BIA, the case received negative
publicity. The New York Times reported,
The Supreme Court has rendered a decision which will startle
most readers. The decision is that there are persons living in the
United States and not subject to the jurisdiction of any State or
Federal Court. Those persons are Indians living in Indian
reservations who commit crimes against other Indians.235
Congress, in short order, passed the Major Crimes Act of 1885, explicitly
granting federal jurisdiction in Indian Territory over seven major Indian-onIndian crimes.236 The Major Crimes Act did not remove tribal jurisdiction
for the same crimes and left in place exclusive tribal jurisdiction for all
other crimes.
In considering the Major Crimes Act, it is important to consider not only
what Congress did, but what Congress did not do. Congress could have
gone much further in intruding upon Native American tribal sovereignty,
but chose not to. In contrast to the BIA proposal, which resulted in the
Major Crimes Act, the Indian Rights Association—a quintessentially
progressive organization that sought to “civilize” and Christianize all
Native Americans—proposed an “Act to Provide for the Establishment of

231. Id. at 102.
232. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
233. Id. at 571-72.
234. Crow Dog contrasts starkly with modern cases of implicit divestiture where the
Court, when faced with similar ambiguity regarding federal and tribal jurisdiction generally
reads into their relationship a loss of tribal sovereignty. The Court in Crow Dog showed
judicial restraint, presuming retained sovereignty in the absence of clear federal policy, a
model the Court ought to consider following in the modern era.
235. The Rights of Crow Dog, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1883, at 4. Bryan Wildenthal states
that the “somewhat hysterical public reaction to this decision [was] orchestrated by the
Bureau of Indian Affairs.” BRYAN H. WILDENTHAL, NATIVE AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY ON
TRIAL: A HANDBOOK WITH CASES, LAWS, AND DOCUMENTS 70 (2003).
236. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1153.
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Courts and Criminal Jurisdiction upon Indian Reservations.”237 Harring
states that this act “would have put Indians under the complete legal force
of U.S. law with few due process protections” and “was a far more
repressive criminal apparatus to deal with misdemeanors and offenses
against white standards of morality.”238 The BIA and Congress rejected this
proposal, adopting the less intrusive Major Crimes Act.
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the Major Crimes Act the year
after it was passed in United States v. Kagama.239 At issue was the source
of congressional power to legislate generally in Indian Territory.
Interestingly, the Court specifically rejected the Indian Commerce Clause
as the source of congressional police power.240 Rather, the Court used a
theory of congressional plenary power based in conquest, paternalism and
racism.241 The Court depicted a binary form of federalism, stating that in
the United States constitutional system there can be only “these two”
sovereigns, the federal government and the state government.242 The Court
thus depicted Indian Territory as a sovereign vacuum, in need of federal
plenary authority. Kagama is an early case of judicial de-recognition.243 By
ignoring the existence of tribal sovereignty, the Court went beyond what
Congress actually said and did in the Major Crimes Act, which did not
purport to extinguish the tribes or their power to prosecute criminal
offenses, both major and minor. Whereas the Court was quick to depict
federal plenary power as engulfing tribal sovereignty, Congress had merely
created concurrent jurisdiction.
The Indian Rights Association, though rebuffed by Congress in 1885
with the Major Crimes Act, did receive one big item on its wish list when
237. HARRING, supra note 190, at 134-35.
238. Id.
239. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
240. Id. at 379.
241. See Lesley Karen Friedman, Native Hawaiians, Self-Determination, and the
Inadequacy of the State Land Trusts, 14 U. HAW. L. REV. 519, 553 (1992); see also David C.
Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection Clause: Indians as Peoples, 38 UCLA L.
REV. 759, 777 (1991).
242. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 379. Justice Thomas, while criticizing Kagama for failing to
locate a textual hook for congressional plenary power, apparently buys into the Kagama
framework that sovereignty can only exist in the federal government or state government. He
states that tribes are separate sovereigns or they are not, implicitly rejecting Marshall’s
domestic dependent nations framework. Suspicious also of federal plenary power, Justice
Thomas therefore lays the groundwork for the argument that tribes can only be recognized as
sovereign through a treaty making process or they are otherwise subject to state jurisdiction.
See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 215-18 (Thomas, J., concurring).
243. See HARRING, supra note 190, at 142.
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Congress passed the Dawes Act of 1887.244 In this legislation, Congress
allotted land to individual tribal members to be held in trust for twenty-five
years and thereafter to be held by the individual in fee simple.245 The
legislation also provided for the sale of the “surplus” of the reservation to
non-Indian buyers, to be held in fee simple immediately. 246 The Dawes Act
was the first of two full-scale legislative assaults on tribal sovereignty.
Private ownership of land within reservations would, it was thought, lead
not only to Indian assimilation, but also to complete state criminal and civil
jurisdiction when the last parcel was sold and the federal trust relationship
ended.247 Allotment proceeded for the next fifty years, creating a
checkerboard pattern of land ownership within reservations, but never
reaching its twin goals of privatizing all land ownership and extinguishing
tribal sovereignty.248 Approximately ninety million acres were transferred
from Indian to non-Indian control during the Allotment Era.249
6. Recognition of Tribal Sovereignty in the Early Twentieth Century
Assimilation efforts, like other Progressive Era policies, continued well
into the twentieth century and culminated with the Citizenship Act of
1924.250 Native Americans had, since the founding, been excluded from
citizenship, with various exceptions for things like private land ownership
and military service.251 Even the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which states that “All persons born . . . in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States,”252
did not grant citizenship to Native Americans because they were not,
generally speaking, “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States.253 By
1924, roughly 58% of Native Americans were already citizens, including
those who had acquired citizenship through land ownership (allotted or

244. General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887).
245. Id. § 5, 24 Stat. at 389.
246. Id.
247. Id. § 6, 24 Stat. at 390 (“[E]very member of the respective . . . tribes of Indians to
whom allotments have been made shall have the benefit and be subject to the laws, both civil
and criminal, of the State or Territory in which they may reside . . . .”); see also HARRING,
supra note 190, at 154.
248. See COHEN, supra note 140, § 1.04, at 73, 78.
249. Id. § 1.04, at 73.
250. Ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (repealed 1952).
251. COHEN, supra note 140, § 1.04, at 78-79.
252. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
253. See Berger, supra note 198, at 1196.
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otherwise), as well as due to service in the United States military. 254 The
Citizenship Act of 1924 granted blanket citizenship to all Native
Americans—no naturalization process was required and no consent was
requested.255 Some tribes explicitly refused to recognize the Citizenship
Act’s applicability to them.256 The Citizenship Act was passed the same
year as the Immigration Act of 1924, which sought to preserve an
“American” identity by restricting immigration from various regions.257
Despite progressive efforts to homogenize American society, the
Citizenship Act, importantly, did not require individuals to give up their
tribal citizenship, as previous naturalization processes had done.258 The
Citizenship Act sought to accomplish the goals of assimilation without
explicitly de-recognizing tribal authority.
The Court acquiesced to the political branches during the assimilationist
period, not questioning congressional plenary power. Whereas in
Worcester, the Court’s characterization of tribes as sovereign entities served
to protect them to some degree from state intrusion, such characterization
was of no avail to protect them from federal power. The Court’s holding in
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock made clear that the Court found no constitutional
protection for tribes from the national government itself.259 There, the Court
held Congress could abrogate a treaty with an Indian tribe based on its
plenary power—a decision firmly rooted in paternalistic theories of the
relationship between the United States and Indian tribes.260 Paternalism lay
at the heart of another Court decision during the Progressive and
Assimilation Eras in United States v. Sandoval.261 When New Mexico and
Arizona joined the United States as the last of the forty-eight contiguous
states in early 1912, the status of its native peoples was called into question
by the enabling acts of Congress. The Supreme Court had previously
excluded the Pueblo of New Mexico from the definition of “Indian” when
interpreting the Non-Intercourse Act of 1834,262 based upon their perceived
254. See Kevin Bruyneel, Challenging American Boundaries: Indigenous People and the
"Gift" of U.S. Citizenship, 18 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 30 (2004).
255. 43 Stat. at 253; see COHEN, supra note 140, § 1.04, at 78-79.
256. For a discussion of the withholding of consent, see Bruyneel, supra note 254.
257. Ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (repealed 1952); see Mae M. Ngai, The Architecture of Race
in American Immigration Law: A Reexamination of the Immigration Act of 1924, 86 J. AM.
HIST. 67 (1999).
258. See COHEN, supra note 140, § 1.04, at 79.
259. 187 U.S. 553, 555 (1903).
260. See id. at 566.
261. 231 U.S. 28, 39 (1913).
262. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2012).
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capacity for self-government as well as their fee simple ownership of
land.263 The Enabling Act for New Mexico, however, extended the NonIntercourse Act and related legislation explicitly to the Pueblo, bringing
them within the guardian-ward relationship.264 The Court in Sandoval found
these provisions of the Enabling Act caused no constitutional harm either to
the tribes or to the newly created State of New Mexico.265 The Court’s
justification for intrusion into tribal, and potentially state, sovereignty was
the plenary power first articulated in Kagama as well as explicitly racial
categorizations underlying the guardian-ward construct.266
While not abandoning the guardian-ward relationship, federal policies
toward native tribes began to change in the 1930s. The political branches’
efforts to re-assert tribal culture and self-determination, if not full-scale
sovereignty, began in earnest with the efforts of John Collier. Collier, a
sociologist who valued community cohesion over stark individualism,
sought to reverse some assimilationist policies, including allotment, by
advocating Indian cultural retention and self-government.267 President
Franklin Roosevelt appointed Collier as the Commissioner of the BIA in
1933, and he served during the entirety of Roosevelt’s administration.268
Collier pushed for and obtained the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934,269 the centerpiece of the “Indian New Deal.” The Indian New Deal
ended the allotment process but did not effectuate a wholesale repeal of the
Dawes Act.270 Rather, it allowed the United States to buy fee simple land
and then return it to its pre-existing status—that of federal land held in trust
for the tribes.271 The Indian New Deal also called for constitution-making
among the tribes, and those tribes that accepted the New Deal adopted tribal
263. United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614, 616, 618 (1876)
264. Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, § 2, 36 Stat. 557, 560; see COHEN, supra note 140, §
1.03, at 57-58.
265. Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 46.
266. See, for example, the Court’s statement that the Pueblos adhere “to primitive modes
of life, largely influenced by superstition and fetichism, and chiefly governed according to
the crude customs inherited from their ancestors, they are essentially a simple, uninformed,
and inferior people.” Id. at 39.
267. See KENNETH R. PHILIP, JOHN COLLIER’S CRUSADE FOR INDIAN REFORM, 1920-1954,
at xii (1977).
268. Id. at xiv, 117.
269. Ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5129).
270. PHILIP, supra note 267, at 159.
271. For a compilation of cases addressing the constitutionality of the Indian
Reorganization Act, including the provisions allowing the re-purchase of former tribal lands,
see Ann K. Wooster, J.D., Validity and Construction of Indian Reorganization Act, 28
A.L.R. Fed. 2d 563 (2008).
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constitutions based upon a model drafted by the BIA. 272 In this regard, the
Indian New Deal “fought” one form assimilation by introducing another—
the imposition of western-style constitutionalism as a condition for
continued recognition.
Nevertheless, the Indian New Deal was an effort by the political
branches to re-recognize aspects of Native American tribal sovereignty that
had been lost in the Allotment Era. Despite Collier’s efforts to get away
from the guardian-ward relationship, Congress insisted upon continued
oversight of the tribes, and planted the seeds for the second full-scale
assault on tribal sovereignty with the passage of the Kansas Act of 1940.
Through the Kansas Act of 1940, Kansas was granted almost complete
criminal jurisdiction within tribal territory, to be followed by grants to more
states.273 With seventy-five years worth of hindsight, the Indian New Deal
looks less like a fully formed “era” of federal-Indian relations, and more
like the efforts of one man (successful as they may have been) to slow a
longer process of de-recognition that began with the Dawes Act in 1887 and
culminated with termination policies in the 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s.
Yet policies enshrined in law during the Indian New Deal continue to
provide the basis for many claims of sovereignty in the present.274
7. Termination
The Termination Era from the mid-1940s until the mid-1960s was a
second attempt at political de-recognition of tribal sovereignty. Despite the
aims of the Indian New Deal, and perhaps in reaction to them, Congress
passed a series of laws aimed at ending the special relationship between the
federal government and the tribes, including the federal trusteeship of tribal
lands, ending tribal self-government, and leaving Native Americans fully
under the sovereignty of state governments.275 Termination included the
granting of criminal or limited-criminal jurisdiction to some states to police
Native American communities.276 Interestingly, though, Congress adopted
272. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, § 16, 48 Stat. at 987 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §
5123).
273. See Act of June 8, 1940, ch. 276, 54 Stat. 249 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
3243); COHEN, supra note 140, § 6.04, at 580-81.
274. Historians, sociologists and other scholars continue to debate Collier’s legacy. For a
discussion of his mixed legacy, see Elmer R. Rusco, John Collier: Architect of Sovereignty
or Assimilation?, 15 AM. INDIAN Q. 49 (1991). See also Lawrence C. Kelly, The Indian
Reorganization Act: The Dream and the Reality, 44 PAC. HIST. REV. 291 (1975).
275. See COHEN, supra note 140, § 1.06, at 84-93.
276. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 15, 1953 (Public Law 280), Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 & 28 U.S.C. § 1360).
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termination policies on a tribe-by-tribe and state-by-state basis, instead of
through wholesale termination legislation.277 For example, Congress passed
Public Law 280 in 1953 which granted full criminal jurisdiction to five
states over Indian Territory.278 The localized process suggests Congress’s
wish to reserve for itself some powers to continue to recognize sovereignty
for some tribes, while not for others. Some of the tribes targeted for
termination, despite large populations and well-developed government
structures, had abundant natural resources, calling into question
congressional motives for termination policies.279
8. The Present Period - Self-Determination
One might be forgiven for a bit of whiplash in attempting to keep up
with federal Indian policy in the mid-twentieth century. After the
termination policies, which attempted to end self-government of the tribes,
the political branches returned to policies of self-government and tribal
sovereignty in the 1960s. Presidents Johnson and Nixon began the process
of re-recognizing tribes that had been de-recognized in the Termination Era.
Congress made further efforts to affirm the place of tribes in the American
constitutional system with the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968 (ICRA).280 Modern federal policies of self-determination are
discussed more fully herein as part of the discussion of why the Court, if it
is attempting to implement federal policy through implicit divestiture, is
doing a poor job.
Despite the federal government’s long oppression of Native Americans,
which was enacted through policies of acculturation, removal, reservation,
allotment and assimilation, federal policy has generally been, since the
founding, to recognize tribal sovereignty, with the important exceptions of
the Allotment and Termination Eras. Those latter policies have been
repudiated since the 1960s. From the 1960s until the present, federal policy
formulated by the political branches has continuously recognized Native
American tribal sovereignty, which makes the current judicial hostility to
Native American tribal sovereignty something of a curiosity. Why did the
Court become hostile to notions of tribal sovereignty during a period of

277. See COHEN, supra note 140, § 1.06, at 88, 91-92.
278. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 588; see COHEN, supra note 140, § 6.04, at 537-78.
279. For the legislative background of termination policies, and the abandonment of the
same, see Michael C. Walch, Note, Terminating the Indian Termination Policy, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 1181 (1983).
280. Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. IV, 82 Stat. 78 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2012)).
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foreign and domestic détente? Some of the potential justifications for
implicit divestiture are addressed in the following sections.
B. Implicit Divestiture Is Not Constitutional in Nature
Perhaps, one might argue, that given the sui generis status of Indian
tribes, the Court was not exercising a power of recognition in Oliphant and
Montana, but was only doing its job by regulating the boundaries of
federalism—highlighting the jurisdictional lines that states, tribes, and the
federal government should not cross. That is, perhaps the Court was
pronouncing upon the constitutional status of tribes. This issue became the
subject of constitutional dialogue between the Court and the political
branches in Duro v. Reina,281 Congress’s “Duro-Fix,”282 and United States
v. Lara.283
First, in Duro v. Reina, the Court held that the Salt River Pima-Maricopa
Indian Community—a federally recognized tribe—lacked jurisdiction to try
an Indian non-member in tribal court.284 Albert Duro, an Indian but not a
member of the Pima-Maricopa Tribe, was alleged to have committed a
murder on tribal land.285 He was arrested by federal authorities and charged
with murder, but the U.S. Attorney declined to prosecute and he was
released to the custody of the Tribe.286 The Tribe, whose criminal
jurisdiction over non-Members was limited to misdemeanors by the ICRA,
charged Duro with the illegal discharge of a weapon.287 Duro challenged his
arrest through the habeas procedure of the ICRA, and argued in federal
court that the Tribe lacked jurisdiction for even the minor misdemeanor
charge.288 The Supreme Court, following the reasoning in Oliphant,
agreed.289 It found that the same issues present for non-Indians in tribal
courts—a lack of voting ability and other “citizenship” rights enabling
participation in tribal governance—were present for non-member Indians as
well, leading to, in the Court’s words, “unfairness” to the defendant.290 As
281. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
282. Pub. L. No. 101-511, tit. VIII, § 8077(b), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892 (1990) (codified at
25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012)); see United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 216 (2004) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (discussing 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)).
283. 541 U.S. 193.
284. Duro, 495 U.S. at 685.
285. Id. at 679.
286. Id. at 680.
287. Id. at 681.
288. Id. at 682.
289. Id. at 685.
290. Id. at 688.
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with Oliphant and Montana, the Court’s assertion of the power to derecognize an aspect of tribal sovereignty in Duro, is constitutionally
suspect.
Before continuing the Duro narrative, let’s step back and consider what
happened. The three branches of the federal government tag-teamed to
create a criminal jurisdiction vacuum within tribes. Duro allegedly killed a
fourteen-year old boy on tribal lands.291 The federal prosecutor (executive
branch) declined to prosecute Duro.292 Because Congress (legislative
branch) had limited tribal criminal jurisdiction to misdemeanors, the Tribe
could not bring felony charges.293 When the Tribe brought a minor
misdemeanor charge, the Supreme Court (judicial branch) prohibited even
this action.294 Duro walked, apparently free to commit more murders on
tribal lands, courtesy of the quirks of federal Indian law.
Congress felt that the Court had overstepped its bounds in Duro and
reacted. Congress amended the ICRA to affirm tribal sovereignty to try a
case just like that of Duro (the “Duro-Fix”).295 The one-sentence
amendment to the ICRA stated that Native American powers of selfgovernment include “the inherent powers of Indian tribes, hereby
recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all
Indians.”296 The question remained, however, as to whether Congress, in
enacting the Duro-Fix, was delegating to the tribes a federal power to
prosecute, or rather recognizing and affirming not just jurisdiction, but
aboriginal sovereignty. That is, was Congress merely allowing the tribes to
exercise what was otherwise a federal power, or was it recognizing the
tribes’ own sovereign rights?297 Congress’s language of recognition served
as a clue. In either case, though, congressional action here was a reassertion of political branch control over the recognition power.
The Court had the chance in United States v. Lara to interpret the DuroFix, including its constitutionality. Billy Jo Lara, like Albert Duro, was an
291. Id. at 679.
292. Id. at 680.
293. Id. at 681.
294. Id. at 685.
295. Pub. L. No. 101-511, tit. VIII, § 8077(b), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892 (1990) (codified at
25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012)).
296. Id.
297. Between the Duro-Fix and the Court’s opinion in Lara, scholars debated this
question. See, e.g., Alex Tallchief Skibine, Duro v. Reina and the Legislation That
Overturned It: A Power Play of Constitutional Dimensions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 767, 769
(1993); L. Scott Gould, The Congressional Response to Duro v. Reina: Compromising
Sovereignty and the Constitution, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 53, 62 (1994).
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Indian accused of a crime by a tribe other than his own, and challenged his
federal arrest as a violation of double jeopardy after having been convicted
in tribal court.298 In deciding his fate, the Court had to interpret not only the
Duro-Fix, but also its own actions in Duro.299 The Court could have “struck
down” the Duro-Fix as a violation of constitutional principles, in a manner
reminiscent of City of Boerne v. Flores300 and Dickerson v. United States,301
and freed Lara. That is, the Court could have held that once an aspect of
tribal sovereignty was lost, even implicitly, then it was gone forever. And
the only possible way Congress could “restore” an inherent power was
through a delegation of federal power, which would trigger double
jeopardy.302 This approach was advocated by Justices Souter and Scalia in
dissent who wrote, “our previous understanding of the jurisdictional
implications of dependent sovereignty were constitutional in nature.”303
However, a majority of the Court felt differently and held that Congress,
in recognizing criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians, was in fact
recognizing and affirming inherent tribal sovereign authority.304 In doing
so, the Court necessarily characterized its own decision in Duro, and by
extension Oliphant and other implicit divestiture cases, as something other
than eternal constitutional law, although it is not clear what that is. The
Court acknowledged to a degree that the recognition power belonged to the
political branches and not to the Court.305 One might think that the Court, in
the face of Congress’s “Duro-Fix,” would begin to “tread lightly” in future
cases. One would be wrong. Congress’s Duro-Fix and Lara did not signal
298. Lara, 541 U.S. at 196-97.
299. See id. at 196.
300. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) was a
legislative “fix” to the Court’s ruling in Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990). In Flores, the Court ruled the RFRA unconstitutional as it applied to the states
because, the Court asserted, Congress cannot alter the substance of Constitutional provisions
(as interpreted by the Court), but can only seek to enforce them through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Flores, 521 U.S. at 536.
301. 530 U.S. 438 (2000). In Dickerson, the Court disallowed a congressional “fix” to the
Court’s ruling in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 431.
302. Under this approach, the Court would not technically “strike down” the Duro-Fix,
but would interpret it in a manner to render it consistent with its understanding of the
Constitution, despite the clear language of the statute recognizing an “inherent” power, not a
delegated one. Justice Thomas calls attention to the problems of delegations of executive
power not only to non-executive branches of government, but also tribal governments. See
Lara, 541 U.S. at 216-17 (Thomas, J., concurring).
303. Id. at 228 (Souter, J., dissenting).
304. Id. at 210.
305. Id. at 207.
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the death of implicit divestiture. Rather, they seem to have embedded it
more by reinforcing the idea that virtually all sovereignty is lost except that
which is specifically affirmed. Congress, at the time it fixed Duro, could
have also “fixed” Oliphant, but chose not to. Congressional silence on the
issue may have emboldened the Court, who seems to have interpreted such
silence as a green light to proceed with implicit divestiture. Thus, the Court
continues to make assumptions about the loss of tribal sovereignty that
intrude upon the recognition power.306
The Supreme Court and Congress, then, both agree that implicit
divestiture is not constitutional in nature. Unlike the Court’s federalism
cases involving states, implicit divestiture is completely divorced from the
text and structure of the Constitution. Rather, it is an exercise through
which the Court itself attempts to structure the relationship between the
United States and the tribes.
C. Implicit Divestiture Is Not Appropriate Federal Common Law-Making
Perhaps the most tenable defense of implicit divestiture jurisprudence is
the argument that the Court is doing nothing more than creating federal
common law, subject to congressional override. The Court’s decision in
Lara, in which it acquiesced to the congressional override of Duro,
supports such a view.307 Federal common law is not and should not be
absent in federal Indian law. Indeed, the rule of explicit divestiture I
propose in Part III of this Article might reasonably be characterized as a
common law rule. However, federal Indian law common law rules must
abide by the limits placed upon the judiciary to create common law in other
contexts. Implicit divestiture is not appropriate federal common law. To
argue that it is, necessitates an expansive view of the judiciary’s common
law-making power that is belied by (1) the limited and circumspect nature
of the federal common law power, (2) the vesting of the recognition power,
and (3) the history of tribal recognition.
306. Rulings under the implicit divestiture framework are not constitutional in nature, as
the Court acknowledges, in the sense that they are not unassailable by the political branches
(in the way that the Court’s rulings in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and
Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) are unassailable). This is not
to say that there is no constitutional lawmaking to be done by the Court outside the context
of implicit divestiture. Appropriate judicial constitutional law in federal Indian law is
discussed in Part III.
307. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 221-23. As Alex Tallchief Skibine notes, the majority’s
reasoning was “deeply perplexing” because the majority re-interpreted previous implicit
divestiture cases as attempts to implement federal policy, not traditional federal common
law. See Skibine, supra note 4, at 79.
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The Court’s Erie doctrine308 significantly reduced the power of federal
courts to create common law.309 Still, there are some limited areas where
the Court may formulate common law. “These instances are ‘few and
restricted,’ and fall into essentially two categories: those in which the
federal rule of decision is ‘necessary to protect uniquely federal interests,’
and those in which Congress has given the courts the power to develop
substantive law.”310 This latter category involves federal areas of
substantive law, such as bankruptcy and admiralty, and allows the judiciary
to fill in the gaps of statutory law.311 Because Congress has not given the
judiciary explicit power to develop substantive federal Indian law, this
latter category cannot be used to justify common Indian lawmaking.
The other category of appropriate federal common law, described in
Texas Instruments, is the protection of federal interests.312 Interestingly,
although the Court in Lara characterized its implicit divestiture rulings as
federal common law, it did not in that case or in any other case point to the
federal interest at stake.313 In Oliphant, the Court seems to suggest that the
federal interest at stake is to protect non-Indians from what the Court
viewed as non-constitutional criminal procedures.314 That justification may
have been plausible in the eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries when
tribes were still treated as akin to foreign sovereigns, but makes no sense in
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, as Native Americans are United
States citizens. In Oliphant’s progeny, the Court makes little, if any, effort
to point to a federal interest it sought to protect.
Further, and more importantly, federal common law is only appropriate
where the political branches do not already occupy the field (to borrow
language from preemption doctrine) by statute or by constitutionally vested
authority.315 If an area of law is addressed by statute or constitutionally
committed to another branch of government, the Court should defer to that
branch’s authority.316 The problem in federal Indian law is, as Alex

308. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
309. Id. at 78-79.
310. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (citations
omitted).
311. Id. at 641.
312. Id. at 640.
313. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 205-07 (2004).
314. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 194 (1978).
315. See generally Skibine, supra note 4.
316. See id. at 97. For a similar argument in the context of federal common law in
international law, see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law
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Tallchief Skibine points out, the “Court seems to think that there are no
constraints because it has given Congress plenary power over Indian
nations . . . if Congress can potentially act without limits in Indian affairs,
so can the Court.”317 Whether congressional plenary power can be justified
or not, the powers of recognition and de-recognition are committed
constitutionally to the political branches, not to the judiciary. If the
Constitution had been silent on the power of recognition, then perhaps the
Court’s implicit divestiture doctrine might have been defensible as federal
common law. But the Constitution is not silent. Even when the political
branches have not explicitly addressed a particular aspect of sovereign
power, the courts are still not warranted in appropriating the prerogative of
another branch to de-recognize that aspect of sovereignty, because the duty
to so lies elsewhere.
The history of Native American tribal recognition, which the Court must
turn to as part of the implicit divestiture exercise, indicates that the political
branches have recognized tribal sovereignty through the nation’s history,
even if they have simultaneously acted to curtail it. The political branches
have occupied the field—literally and figuratively. Although there is a
place for common law in federal Indian law, adjusting sovereign powers is
a matter to be worked out between the tribes and the political branches.
What is a court to do then, when faced with the issue of whether a tribe
may exercise a particular sovereign power that the political branches have
not explicitly addressed even though they have the constitutional authority
to do so? The Court must maintain the status quo, allowing the political
branches to protect explicitly any federal interest that they deem harmed by
the exercise of tribal sovereignty. The proposed rule of explicit divestiture
is discussed more fully in Part III of this paper.
D. Implicit Divestiture Does Not Implement Federal Policy
Justice Thomas, while calling into question the constitutionality of the
Act of 1871, indicates that the statute “nevertheless reflects the view of the
political branches that the tribes had become a purely domestic matter.”318
Even if that were true 145 years ago (and the historical record suggests
otherwise), there is no reason that federal policy must remain fixed in the
1870s. If the Court is attempting to implement federal policy through
implicit divestiture, it is doing a poor job. Federal policy since the late
as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815
(1997).
317. Skibine, supra note 4, at 97-98.
318. Lara, 541 U.S. at 218 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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1960s has consistently characterized the relationship of the United States to
the tribes as “nation-to-nation,” even if it leaves some of the particulars
unaddressed.
Although the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 created a crude
preliminary process of recognition and acknowledgement, the formal
process used today by which the United States recognizes tribal sovereignty
was put in place in 1978.319 The federal acknowledgement process is a
creature of the BIA, relying on delegated authority from Congress to the
executive to “prescribe such regulations as he may think fit for carrying into
effect the various provisions of any act relating to Indian affairs.”320
Through the promulgation of regulations, the BIA created an application
process through which tribes can apply for federal recognition (and all the
benefits that go along with recognition, including funding for housing,
health and other services, and potential gaming operations).321 The BIA has
set up criteria for recognition, which include elements of Indian “identity,”
communal cohesion, governmental structure and governing documents.322
The BIA’s federal acknowledgement process, like implicit divestiture, is
not without its critics. Matthew L.M. Fletcher offers a sharp critique of the
both the theory behind the federal acknowledgement process and the
manner in which it has been implemented.323 Vine Deloria, Jr. has sharply
criticized the apparent ability of low-level federal bureaucrats to negate
previous acts of Congress respecting tribal recognition.324

319. See Mark D. Myers, Federal Recognition of Indian Tribes in the United States, 12
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 271, 273 (2001).
320. 25 U.S.C. § 9 (2012).
321. See Myers, supra note 319, at 279-83.
322. 25 C.F.R. § 83.11 (2015).
323. Matthew L. M. Fletcher, Politics, History and Semantics: The Federal Recognition
of Indian Tribes, 82 N.D. L. REV. 487 (2006). See also the two books reviewed by Fletcher
therein: RENÉE ANN CRAMER, CASH, COLOR, AND COLONIALISM: THE POLITICS OF TRIBAL
ACKNOWLEDGMENT (2005) and MARK EDWIN MILLER, FORGOTTEN TRIBES: UNRECOGNIZED
INDIANS AND THE FEDERAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT PROCESS (2004).
324. Fletcher, supra note 323, at 515-16; see also Gerald Carr, Origins and Development
of the Mandatory Criteria Within the Federal Acknowledgement Process, 14 RUTGERS RACE
& L. REV. 1, 4, 8 (2013). Carr calls attention to a curious statute, 25 U.S.C. § 5130 (formerly
§ 479a) the “findings” of which found that in addition to BIA and congressional recognition,
tribes can be recognized by a “court decision.” Courts, though asked to do so, have never
recognized tribes in terms of extending recognition though, as argued herein, they have
judicially de-recognized various sovereign powers of the tribes. The constitutionality of the
statute, or at least its “finding,” is suspect, given the apparent lack of authority for an Article
I Congress to take an Article II prerogative power and vest it in an Article III court.
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In addition to the BIA process and congressional policies to encourage
Indian self-determination, successive heads of the executive branch have
consistently lauded tribal sovereignty since the 1970s. In a special message
to Congress in 1970, President Nixon affirmed the national policy of
recognizing and encouraging Native American self-determination.325
President Carter signed the American Indian Religious Freedom Act,
affirming the right of Native Americans to practice religious ceremonies
otherwise prohibited by law.326 On January 24, 1983, Ronald Reagan issued
a presidential proclamation regarding the relationship of the United States
to Native American tribes and nations. There, he expressed his
administration’s intent to “restore tribal governments to their rightful place
among the governments of this nation and to enable tribal governments,
along with state and local governments, to resume control over their own
affairs.”327 In furtherance of that goal, President Reagan moved the White
House Liaison Office for Native Tribes to the Office of Intergovernmental
Affairs to underscore its “commitment to recognizing tribal governments on
a government-to-government basis.”328 Presidents George H.W. Bush,
Clinton, and George W. Bush have issued similar statements.329 President
Obama, during the course of announcing the United States’ support for the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, told
Native American leaders that he wanted to improve the “nation-to-nation”
325. See President Richard Nixon, Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs,
AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (July 8, 1970), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2573.
Although many scholars regard Nixon’s legacy in Indian affairs favorably, Carole Goldberg
has recently offered a sharp critique based upon his Supreme Court appointments, including
those who helped create implicit divestiture. See Carole Goldberg, President Nixon’s Indian
Law Legacy: A Counterstory, 63 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1506 (2016).
326. Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2012)).
327. Statement of President Ronald W. Reagan on American Indian Policy 5 (Jan. 24,
1983), http://www.tribalconsultation.arizona.edu/docs/Executive%20Branch/idc-002004. pdf.
328. Id. at 2.
329. For George H.W. Bush’s characterization of the federal Indian relationship as
“government-to-government,” see President George Bush, Proclamation 6230—National
American Indian Heritage Month, 1990, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Nov. 14, 1990),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=1933. For Bill Clinton’s statement using the same
characterization, see President William J. Clinton, Executive Order 13084—Consultation and
Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (May 14, 1998),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=55959&st=clinton&st1=native+american.
For George W. Bush’s statement using the same characterization, see President George W.
Bush, Executive Order: American Indian and Alaska Native Education, WHITE HOUSE (Apr.
30, 2004), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/04/ 2004043010.html.
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relationship between the United States and the tribes.330 The political
branches have occupied the field of sovereign recognition. The Court
should respect that. To the extent the Court must guess at federal policy
regarding any particular sovereign power because the political branches
have not been clear,331 it ought to give primary importance to the statements
of the political branches affirming tribal sovereignty and nationhood, rather
than assuming the political branches consider sovereign powers to be lost.
Further, the Court itself has at least once conceded that implicit
divestiture is not an attempt to implement federal policy. In Oliphant, the
Court stated, “Even ignoring . . . congressional policy, Indians do not have
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians absent affirmative delegation of such
power by Congress.”332 That is, faced with an inability to ascertain federal
policy, the Court’s approach was to assume a divestiture of a sovereign
power, rather than maintaining the status quo until such time as the political
branches explicitly announce a policy. In doing so, the Court created its
own policy.
E. Justice Thomas’s Concerns
As indicated in the introduction, the Court’s implicit divestiture doctrine
has many critics. One prominent critic of the Court’s modern Indian law
jurisprudence in general is Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice Thomas has
characterized federal Indian policy as it relates to tribal sovereignty as
“schizophrenic” and suggests the confusion has likewise created tensions in
Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the same.333 Justice Thomas has
staked out a curious position in tribal sovereignty cases. Beginning with
Lara, Justice Thomas has repeatedly called for a complete overhaul of the
Court’s approach to resolve the tensions between plenary power and
inherent sovereignty, even while concurring with the majority in most
Indian law opinions.334 It is not clear how much support Justice Thomas has
attracted. His many concurrences, which read like dissents, have not been
330. Krissah Thompson, U.S. Will Sign U.N. Declaration on Rights of Native People,
Obama Tells Tribes, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/12/16/AR2010121603136.html.
331. In an internal court memo discussing Duro, Justice Scalia indicated that the Court’s
efforts in tribal sovereignty cases consist of “[seeking] to discern what the current state of
affairs ought to be by taking into account . . . congressional ‘expectations.’” Memorandum
from Antonin Scalia to William Brennan (Apr. 4, 1990), reprinted in FLETCHER, supra note
18, at 345.
332. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978).
333. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 219 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
334. Steele, supra note 20, at 685-86.
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joined by other Court members. However, Justice Thomas’s dissenting
opinion in Michigan v. Bay Hills Indian Community, in which he argued for
a limited conception of tribal sovereign immunity, garnered three additional
votes.335 And certainly at least four members of the Court, presumably
including Thomas, were skeptical of tribal sovereignty in the recent Dollar
General split decision.336 Justice Thomas’s concerns deserve consideration
here in light of their relation to the recognition power and implicit
divestiture.
Justice Thomas has critiqued federal Indian law jurisprudence as recently
as the 2015 term. His concurring opinion in Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle
suggests he remains suspicious of the notion that the tribes retain any
aboriginal sovereignty.337 However, his most extensive commentary of
federal Indian law is found in his Lara concurrence to which he has
repeatedly cited. In Lara, Justice Thomas calls attention to a tension created
in the Court’s jurisprudence by two competing notions: (1) that Congress
has plenary power to legislate on behalf of the tribes; and (2) that the tribes
retain inherent and aboriginal sovereignty.338 If Congress truly has plenary
power to abrogate tribal sovereign powers, he argues, then tribal
sovereignty itself is nullified, especially as it is characterized in Wheeler—
as a source of power distinct and separate from Congress.339 Justice Thomas
is suspicious, however, of congressional plenary power in Indian affairs,
which is consistent with his wider jurisprudence, through which he seeks to
root congressional power in explicit textual commitments.340
Justice Thomas is also suspicious of tribal sovereignty itself, at least for
tribes who have not had their sovereignty specifically re-affirmed through
treaty. In this, Justice Thomas’s approach is similar to implicit divestiture.
335. 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2045-55 (2014) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
336. See Dollar General Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016).
337. “I continue to have concerns about our precedents regarding Indian law . . . .” Puerto
Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1877 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) (citing his concurrence in Lara, 541 U.S. at 214-26).
338. Lara, 541 U.S. at 214-15.
339. See id. Justice Thomas’s concerns are an iteration of an ongoing concern regarding
“imperium imperio”—how can a state exist within another state. For a discussion of an older
debate regarding the same issue, see ALISON LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN FEDERALISM 55-94 (2011).
340. Justice Thomas has been careful to distinguish between congressional plenary
power and executive power. While suspicious of congressional plenary power to legislate, he
leaves open the door for executive power. In this, Justice Thomas’s approach may be closer
to the foreign sovereign recognition cases in finding the executive to have sole recognition
power. See Steele, supra note 20, at 682.
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Indeed, one may say it is implicit divestiture on steroids, a kind of judicial
termination policy where the Court would not only hold that some tribes are
divested of particular sovereign powers, but that they are divested of
sovereignty itself. If one follows Justice Thomas’s approach to its logical
conclusion, as he asks us to do, one would find many tribes judicially
terminated and tribal members living only as citizens of the United States
and the several states. Justice Thomas’s approach, presumably, is to state
that Congress had no authority to pass the Major Crimes Act,341 for
example, but also that tribal sovereignty in many cases has been completely
annihilated through the Act of 1871. What’s left? Native American
individuals who are the citizens of the state in which they reside, as well as
citizens of the United States. The states would exercise, then, full criminal
and regulatory authority over Native Americans, with no governmental role
left for tribes. Justice Thomas’s approach, if adopted, would force the
United States to return to a treaty-making process with the tribes if it
wished to affirm tribal sovereignty and negotiate with the tribes on a nationto-nation basis.
Justice Thomas offers a thoughtful critique of federal Indian
jurisprudence and he is right to call attention to the questionable sources of
congressional plenary power—a doctrine which runs counter to the idea of
a national government founded upon limited and enumerated legislative
powers. However, his approach to tribal sovereignty suffers from the same
constitutional defect as implicit divestiture—that is, he assumes the
judiciary can exercise a power of de-recognition. Even if Justice Thomas
were to find no constitutional home or status for the tribes, as a member of
the Court he must still defer to the executive branch in the exercise of the
recognition power. The significance he would ascribe to the Statute of 1871
is misplaced for reasons set forth herein. The Act of 1871 was not a
sovereignty Rubicon and treaty making is not the “one mechanism” for
sovereign nations to interact with each other, as he asserts.342 Not only in
tribal affairs, but also in foreign affairs, sovereign or quasi-sovereign
entities may be recognized even in the absence of treaties, as is the case
with Taiwan.
Justice Thomas’s approach demonstrates the perils of a binary
federalism. He falls into the same trap as the Court did in Kagama, in the
belief that there are but two sovereigns within our federal system. Should
the Court follow Justice Thomas’s reasoning in some sort of judicial
341. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-90).
342. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 219 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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termination of tribal sovereignty, it will make the same mistake the Court in
Kagama did—reading into the Act of 1871 congressional intent to
extinguish tribal sovereignty where such intent is not there. Even the Act
under direct consideration in Kagama—the Major Crimes Act—does not
purport to extinguish tribal sovereignty, although it intrudes upon it by
establishing concurrent jurisdiction in criminal cases. There is no need to
interpret the Statute of 1871 as the defining moment of Native American
sovereignty. To the extent the political branches did, during the height of
the United States’ imperial period, disparage tribal sovereignty near the
point of extinction, as it also did during the Termination Era, there is no
reason they could not retreat and re-establish it through the recognition
power. Even if the Act of 1871 had embedded a de-recognition policy, it
has been overridden by subsequent recognitions of native sovereignty, by
both political branches.
IV. Replacing Implicit Divestiture with Explicit
(and Constitutional) Divestiture
A. A Rule of Explicit Divestiture
When the Supreme Court has confronted the sovereign status of foreign
entities, it has remained “hands off” and deferential to the political
branches. When confronted with the sovereign status of Indian tribes and
nations, the Court has chosen to involve itself much more aggressively in
the substance of the issues. The Court’s greater involvement is
understandable to a point, in that Indian tribes and nations are closely
intertwined with the United States historically, geographically and
constitutionally in ways that foreign sovereigns are not. It is not
unreasonable for the Court to do in federal Indian law what it often does in
other areas of constitutional law—referee jurisdictional disputes between
competing government institutions. Nevertheless, the prerogative power to
recognize (and de-recognize) sovereign entities, whether foreign or
domestic, remains with the political branches in the least, if not solely with
the executive. The very same reasons that lead the Court to avoid ruling on
the sovereign status of foreign entities (the need for unity and clarity) also
demand that the Court not muddy the waters in Indian policy.
The Court’s foray into judicial de-recognition has led to unpredictable
and sometimes contradictory results. Whereas Oliphant, Montana, and
Strate all purport to have found a historical basis sufficient for determining
that various aspects of sovereignty have been divested because they are
“inconsistent” with the status of the tribe, Wheeler and Santa Clara suggest
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that tribes retain inherent aboriginal sovereignty. The Court has derecognized a large enough number of sovereign powers that aboriginal
sovereignty has been judicially reduced to not much more than a theory that
expresses itself in double jeopardy cases. As for predicting what the
Supreme Court or any other federal court will do when faced with a
contested exercise of tribal sovereignty, it is anyone’s guess. Recently, the
Fifth Circuit has offered a more liberal interpretation of the Montana
exceptions,343 but the Supreme Court remains divided. Wheeler and Santa
Clara also state that tribal sovereignty is subject to complete legislative
defeasance by the United States, in a way that state sovereignty is not.344
Yet if sovereignty is to mean anything, it ought not to be extinguishable at
the legislative whim of another sovereign. The Court does not currently
have a workable system for deciding cases of tribal sovereignty.
The Court should therefore adopt a rule of explicit divestiture. Under
explicit divestiture, the Court would presume all sovereign powers are
retained except those which have been explicitly and constitutionally
surrendered. Explicit divestiture begins with the Court acknowledging, as it
has many times before, that Indian tribes in North America were sovereign
entities prior to the arrival of Europeans and that aboriginal sovereignty is
perpetual, though subject to extinction or diminution through conquest.
Under explicit divestiture, the Court would continue to acknowledge the
losses of sovereign powers effectuated through treaty or appropriate statute.
The Court would abandon the third prong of the Oliphant/Montana
formulation—the idea that sovereign powers that are inconsistent with their
status as domestic dependent nations have been lost. Using an explicit
divestiture rule, the Court would adopt a default position that “All is
retained except that which is specifically surrendered.” That is, in the
absence of clear statements from the political branches indicating their
intrusion into traditional aspects of sovereignty, the Court should assume
such sovereignty remains. In the presence of such statements, the Court
should restrict itself to its traditional constitutional duty of examining the
source of power for federal action.
In following a rule of explicit divestiture, the Court would not be
breaking new ground. Rather, it would be returning to the pragmatic and
constitutional approach used in Ex parte Crow Dog. There, the Court was
343. See Dollar General Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167 (5th Cir.
2014).
344. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (“The sovereignty that the
Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of
Congress and is subject to complete defeasance.”).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

132

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

asked by the BIA to find that the federal government could exercise
criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country for Indian-on-Indian crime.345
Essentially, the BIA asked the Court to find that the tribes were implicitly
divested of a sovereign power—exclusive criminal jurisdiction in Indian
Territory. Finding no clear and unambiguous language in the treaties,
however, the Court declined, and the matter was subsequently placed before
the political branches, who responded as the BIA hoped.346 The Court then
reviewed the congressional response (the Major Crimes Act) to ascertain its
constitutionality in Kagama.347 Even if one disagrees with the Court’s
decision in Kagama, as many scholars do,348 the constitutional dialogic
process set off by Crow Dog is a good pattern for the modern Court to
follow.
This approach would call into question a line of cases. For example, had
the Court used an explicit divestiture approach in Oliphant, it would have
followed the lead of Justice Thurgood Marshall and Chief Justice Burger,
who would have limited the Court’s inquiry into whether the Suquamish
had surrendered through treaty or statute the power to try non-Indian
criminals.349 Similarly, the result in Montana might very well be different
under an explicit divestiture approach given that most treaties establishing
reservations do not expressly limit tribal regulatory authority. Other cases
called into question include those discussed herein, such as Strate and
Plains Commerce Bank.
A rule of explicit divestiture would help resolve issues currently facing
the Court or likely to face the Court. For example, in Dollar General, had
the Court addressed the merits, and had the Court adopted an explicit
divestiture rule, the Court would look only to see whether the national
government, through treaty or statute, had explicitly divested the
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians of civil jurisdiction over a tort claim
by a member against a non-member for acts alleged to have occurred on
tribal lands, either through treaty or statute. Addie Rolnick points us to
several issues of criminal law for which tribal jurisdiction are still in
question due to the Court’s current jurisprudence, including tribal
extraterritorial jurisdiction over members and juvenile justice.350
345. See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 236 and accompanying text.
347. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
348. See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 21; Frickey, supra note 141, at 489.
349. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
350. Rolnick, supra note 4.
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A rule of explicit divestiture would also serve as a partial response to the
concerns raised by Justice Thomas in Lara. Justice Thomas’s two concerns
with modern federal Indian law jurisprudence are: (1) that he cannot find a
constitutional basis for federal plenary power and (2) he has concerns that
there is no strong basis for continued aboriginal sovereignty in the absence
of treaty making.351 Justice Thomas appears willing to go further than
implicit divestiture and assume all aboriginal sovereignty is lost, or at least
that which has not been established through treaty.
To his first concern, a rule of explicit divestiture does not assume the
existence of federal plenary power, and would allow Justice Thomas and
like-minded thinkers to continue to question it. As with any other piece of
federal legislation, the Court may analyze acts of divestiture to ensure they
are rooted in an enumerated power. Treaties, especially ones with Native
American tribes, are likewise subject to some judicial scrutiny.
To Justice Thomas’s second concern, however, explicit divestiture would
flip the Court’s assumptions about tribal sovereignty. Under the Court’s
current implicit divestiture jurisprudence, the Court scours the historical
record to pick out evidence suggesting any particular sovereign power is
preserved or lost. Using such an approach, it is no wonder that the Act of
1871 stands out as central. Through explicit divestiture, though, where
tribal sovereignty is presumed to continue in the absence of clear statements
from the political branches, the Act of 1871 recedes in importance.
B. What Role Is Left for the Court?
Although the Court would show more deference to the political branches
in structuring the relationship between the United States and the tribes
under an explicit divestiture approach, the Court would not transform itself
into a rubber-stamping branch. The Court would not adopt a “where
Congress goes, we will follow” attitude, as it seemed to do in earlier cases
like Kagama and Lone Wolf. Just as implicit divestiture runs afoul of the
separation of powers, wholesale judicial acquiescence in unmoored federal
power over the tribes would render the judiciary a meaningless branch in
Indian law. Rather, under explicit divestiture, the judiciary could and
should investigate the sources of congressional and executive power to
legislate for or otherwise interact with tribes. The judiciary should maintain
its ability to serve as a check on federal and state interactions with tribes.
Further, in Indian law, there remains a constitutional question that is
entirely appropriate for the Court to address. That question is “Do tribes
351. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 214–26 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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have constitutional status?” Judges, scholars and the tribes themselves are
divided on the question. The tribes were not represented at the Convention
in Philadelphia and tribes as such are not represented in Congress. The most
concerted effort to create an “Indian” state—the State of Sequoyah—was
rebuffed by Congress.352 And yet the Constitution acknowledges tribes in
several places. The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment sought to
preserve tribes as self-governing entities by carving out an exception to the
Citizenship Clause.353 And the Tenth Amendment is, as its ultimate clause
suggests, a nod to popular and not just state sovereignty.354 If Native
Americans have truly become part of “We the People” through citizenship
and constitution-making, then they ought to be able to take advantage of the
federal structure offered by the United States constitutional system. If the
Court truly believes in the principles it unanimously espoused in its “Ode to
Federalism” in Bond v. United States,355 it should protect, not attack, tribal
sovereignty. In any event, the question is worth considering. Even if the
judiciary does not have the only or ultimate say on the constitutional
question, it still has a say. Further, even if the Court were to find a
constitutional “home” for tribes, such a finding would not render the
recognition power a nullity with respect to tribes. The political branches
352. See ROBERT L. TSAI, AMERICA'S FORGOTTEN CONSTITUTIONS 152-84 (2014).
353. See Berger, supra note 198.
354. U.S. CONST. amend. X. Carol Tebben suggests the federalism principles behind the
Tenth Amendment serve to protect tribal sovereignty. See Carol Tebben, An American
Trifederalism Based upon the Constitutional Status of Tribal Nations, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
318 (2003).
355. 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011) (“Federalism is more than an exercise in setting the
boundary between different institutions of government for their own integrity. State
sovereignty is not just an end in itself: Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that
derive from the diffusion of sovereign power. Some of these liberties are of a political
character. The federal structure allows local policies ‘more sensitive to the diverse needs of a
heterogeneous society,’ permits ‘innovation and experimentation,’ enables greater citizen
‘involvement in democratic processes,’ and makes government ‘more responsive by putting
the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.’ Federalism secures the freedom of the
individual. It allows States to respond, through the enactment of positive law, to the
initiative of those who seek a voice in shaping the destiny of their own times without having
to rely solely upon the political processes that control a remote central power. True, of
course, these objects cannot be vindicated by the Judiciary in the absence of a proper case or
controversy; but the individual liberty secured by federalism is not simply derivative of the
rights of the States. Federalism also protects the liberty of all persons within a State by
ensuring that laws enacted in excess of delegated governmental power cannot direct or
control their actions. By denying any one government complete jurisdiction over all the
concerns of public life, federalism protects the liberty of the individual from arbitrary power.
When government acts in excess of its lawful powers, that liberty is at stake.”).
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still have a role in structuring what remains an ambiguous relationship
among the national government, the states, and the tribes.
Under explicit divestiture, the Court would continue to play the same
role it does in other federalism cases. The Supreme Court has no say in the
creation of new states, for example. To create and “recognize” new states,
Congress must pass enabling acts, signed by the President, and states must
adopt state constitutions that comport with the enabling act and with the
federal Constitution. Once admitted, however, states enter the Union on
equal footing with other states. At that point, the Court steps in to fulfill its
constitutional duty to determine whether state laws violate the Constitution
and whether a congressional exercise of power unjustifiably interferes with
a power reserved to the states. Similarly, the Court has no say in the
recognition or de-recognition of tribes. However, once those tribes are
recognized and become part of the constitutional order, the Court should, as
it does with states, police jurisdictional boundaries.
C. Other Proposals: Similarities and Differences
Other scholars have proposed similar ways of getting away from implicit
divestiture. Michalyn Steele suggests the use of the political question
doctrine as a feasible way for the Court to remove itself from the
contentious issues of tribal sovereignty.356 That is, the Court could
acknowledge the lack of judiciable manageable standards for determining
inherent sovereignty and whether certain sovereign powers are inconsistent
with the tribes’ status, leaving such questions to the political branches. This
approach would be far better than the current doctrine of implicit
divestiture. For, under implicit divestiture, the Court has adopted a position
of suspicion and hostility toward retained tribal sovereignty, whereas under
the political question doctrine, the Court would at least be neutral on the
issue and the tribes would be able to avail themselves of the political
process. Indeed, Steele makes the case for a similar rule of explicit
divestiture by arguing that “courts should presume that tribes have retained
inherent authority unless Congress has specifically and explicitly divested
the tribe of [that] particular [authority].”357 An added value of Steele’s
approach is that it allows the Court some face-saving as it upends nearly
four decades of jurisprudence. “[T]he Court can justifiably reverse course
after examining the struggle of lower courts to find judicially manageable
standards. . . . [I]t can undo precedent when presented with evidence of the
356. Steele, supra note 20, at 672.
357. Id.
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infirmity of its previously announced standards.”358 A rule of explicit
divestiture as I propose herein would demand that the Court confess to and
repent of its past doctrine. Such an abrupt course change is sometimes hard
to effectuate. Steele’s political question approach would follow the pattern
of other political question cases decided on a lack of judicially manageable
standards, and permit the Court to exit the scene with more grace and
dignity.
Yet, as Steele acknowledges, adopting the political question doctrine in
the area of tribal sovereignty would be controversial because it would
seemingly put the tribes’ existence at the mercy of the political branches,
with no apparent recourse to the courts. For this reason, Steele does not
argue for a “wholesale embrace” of the political question doctrine in Indian
affairs, but rather seeks to engage in a discussion of its potential
applicability. Nevertheless, Steele states that under this approach, “tribal
challenges to congressional diminutions of inherent tribal authority
must . . . be treated as political questions.”359 Although this approach would
be better than implicit divestiture, it opens the tribes up to termination
without judicial recourse, contrary to their acknowledged status in
Cherokee Nation and Worcester. The history of the Allotment and
Termination Eras informs us that the political branches may turn hostile
toward tribal sovereignty in short order, perhaps in the context of global
conflict or, more likely, with the discovery of valuable resources on tribal
lands.360 The political question doctrine approach would preclude the Court
from investigating and enforcing the limits of congressional power in
Indian affairs as well as investigating and opining upon the constitutional
status of the tribes.
While it is true that the Court should give greater deference to political
branch determination regarding tribal sovereignty, this deference should be
based upon an acknowledgement that the recognition power is vested in the
political branches, and not in the judiciary. The advantage to an explicit
divestiture approach over the political question doctrine is that the Court
could still exercise its Article III powers to police jurisdictional boundaries
among federal, state, and tribal authorities. Under a rule of explicit
358. Id. at 706.
359. Id. at 710.
360. Frank Pommersheim has expressed skepticism of the reliability of Congress to
respect tribal sovereignty. “The reality today is that tribes are whipsawed sometimes by
Congress, sometimes by the Supreme Court. Occasionally they get assistance from Congress
as in the Duro override legislation, and occasionally, though not in recent memory, from the
Supreme Court itself.” Pommersheim, supra note 1, at 305-06.
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divestiture, the Court could employ a judicial shield in the defense of tribal
sovereignty; under the political question doctrine, it could not.
Addie Rolnick advocates for an “inside out” approach to tribal
sovereignty in the criminal context, by which questions of retained
sovereign powers are centered upon and resolved by their relationship to
tribal self-governance, rather than an “outside in” approach where tribal
sovereign powers are considered merely to be gap-fillers in the maze of
federal and state jurisdiction.361 While not specifically abandoning implicit
divestiture, the “inside out” approach would certainly be more favorable to
tribes and provide greater flexibility in the design and implementation of
tribal criminal justice systems. She notes that various scholars have
advocated this approach, and some lower courts already employ it, despite
tensions with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.362 Indeed, the Fifth
Circuit’s opinion in Dollar General may be characterized as moving in this
direction.
This “inside out” approach is a much better way to address tribal
criminal jurisdiction within the Court’s current implicit divestiture
framework by reframing the question of whether a sovereign power is
inconsistent with a tribe’s status as whether the sovereign power is an
element of a tribe’s sovereignty and whether it has to be taken away.363 If
the implicit divestiture doctrine is to remain in place (and there appears to
be only one member of the current Court even interested in a wholesale reevaluation of tribal sovereignty law), then Rolnick’s approach makes sense.
It offers a way to render implicit divestiture more predictable and
determinate, as well as friendly to tribal sovereignty, or at least not hostile
to it. However, the use of an “inside out” approach does not avoid the
constitutional issue raised herein, for it would leave power in the hands of
the judiciary to de-recognize tribal sovereignty, even if the bar for derecognition is raised. It is also unclear whether the “inside out” approach
could transfer easily to the civil arena, where the Court has been most
active in recent years in divesting tribes of sovereignty.
V. Conclusion
When Anglo-American colonists sought to justify their separation from
British rule, they turned to one of England’s own—John Locke, the
formidable defender of the Glorious Revolution—to find articulation of
361. Rolnick, supra note 4, at 1640.
362. Id. at 1645-46.
363. Id. at 1640.
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their cause. And while Locke’s two treatises on government played a
central role in the unfolding drama, his Some Thoughts Concerning
Education was likewise enlisted in the cause.364 There, Locke argued that
parents have a responsibility to treat their children as rational beings by
rearing them with patience and kindness, with the goal of preparing them
for the responsibilities of adulthood.365 Locke emphasized that parents
should train their children to use their own reason.366 American colonists
argued that Brtish authorities did not treat the colonists as rational humans
and did not allow the colonies to “mature” into self-governance.367
Therefore, they said, the British were violating their responsibility as a just
“parent,” and forcible separation was justified.368
Two strains of American paternalism developed out of this revolutionary
rhetoric. First, the “Lockean” kind by which newly acquired American
territories were encouraged to “mature” into self-governing states. Indeed,
the statehood process, as first set forth in the Northwest Ordinance, created
new states on equal footing with the original ones throughout the long
nineteenth century.369 The second strain of paternalism, though, disallowed
for growth and maturity in the “ward.” Under this latter theory, the ward
was considered permanently unable of full participation in civic life. This
brand of paternalism was used to justify slavery as well as restrictions on
women’s civil rights.
Paternalism has permeated federal-Indian relations throughout United
States history and continues to do so today, primarily through Supreme
Court doctrine. The characterization of the Native Americans as “wards”
364. See JOHN LOCKE, SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDUCATION (Bartleby.com 2001)
(1693), http://www.bartleby.com/37/1/. For an argument that Some Thoughts Concerning
Education, along with an Essay on Human Understanding, were more widely used than the
Second Treatise on Government in framing the revolutionary debate, see JAY FLIEGELMAN,
PRODIGALS AND PILGRIMS: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AGAINST PATRIARCHAL AUTHORITY,
1750-1800 (1982); see also HOLLY BREWER, BY BIRTH OR CONSENT: CHILDREN, LAW & THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN AUTHORITY (2005).
365. LOCKE, supra note 364, §§ 34-42.
366. Id. §§ 61-62.
367. See FLIEGELMAN, supra note 364, at 3-4.
368. See, e.g., THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE pt. 3 (1776), reprinted in THOMAS
PAINE’S COMMON SENSE: THE CALL TO INDEPENDENCE 78 (Thomas Wendel ed., 1975) (“But
Britain is the parent country, say some. Then the more shame upon her conduct. Even brutes
do not devour their young, nor savages make war upon their families; . . . .”).
369. Territories acquired out of the Louisiana Purchase and Mexican Cession became
states. However, the statehood process seems to have stopped; the United States maintains
territories in Guam, Samoa, and Puerto Rico who, in legal structure at least, have come to
resemble the old English colonies.
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and the federal government—complete with a “Great White Father” at the
head—as the “guardian” found a place in both law and policy. 370 And yet
the historical record provides no clear answer to the question of which
strain of paternalism the federal government in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries proposed to adopt with the tribes (regardless of their
need to have a “guardian” in the first place). Implicit divestiture has
calcified paternalism with respect to native tribes by suggesting that tribal
governance in general and tribal courts in particular are not to be trusted in
the administration of justice to tribal outsiders.
We live in a historical moment where the political branches are relatively
friendly toward the notion of tribal sovereignty, compared with past eras.
The Tribal Law and Order Act amended the Indian Civil Rights Act to give
tribes greater sentencing power for felonies, although it does not come close
to allowing tribes to punish as they see fit.371 The 2013 Reauthorization of
the Violence Against Women Act granted tribes the right to prosecute nonIndians for certain cases of domestic violence, with the promise of even
greater criminal jurisdiction to come.372 The Obama administration in 2010
affirmed United States support for the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous People.373 His predecessors in the Oval Office have
dealt with tribes on a nation-to-nation basis. Of the three branches of
government, the judiciary is the one currently suspicious of, if not
completely hostile to, native sovereignty.
The Court’s treatment of tribal sovereignty is not only needless, but
violates the separation of powers. The Constitution spells out who has the
power to interact with sovereign entities, including the power to recognize
them and the power to de-recognize them and it is not the Court. The Court
should more closely follow the Constitution’s vesting of the recognition
power by abandoning implicit divestiture and replacing it with a rule of
explicit divestiture.
370. See, e.g., FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT WHITE FATHER: THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN (1986); WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, RED MAN’S
LAND / WHITE MAN’S LAW: A STUDY OF THE PAST AND PRESENT STATUS OF THE AMERICAN
INDIANS (1971); LORING BENSON PRIEST, UNCLE SAM’S STEPCHILDREN: THE REFORMATION
OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, 1865-1887 (1942).
371. See Tribal Law and Order Act, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2261 (2010) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 21, 25, 28, and 42 U.S.C.)
372. See 2013 Reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act, tit. IX, Pub. L. No.
113-4, § 904, 127 Stat. 54, 120 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304).
373. Caren Bohan, Obama Backs U.N. Indigenous Rights Declaration, REUTERS (Dec.
16, 2010), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-obama-tribes/obama-backs-u-n-indigenousrights-declaration-idUSTRE6BF4QJ20101216?sp=true.
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Despite the political branches’ currently friendliness to tribes, the lessons
of history are that federal policy toward tribal sovereignty can change, and
change quickly. Not only was federal policy toward tribal policy hostile in
the latter half of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the
twentieth, but after a period of friendly, even if paternalistic, policies during
the “Indian New Deal” of the Franklin Roosevelt administration, the policy
changed quickly with the onset of the Cold War. Global events or domestic
energy crises might cause the federal government to alter course again,
perhaps engaging in another period of termination. Under such
circumstances, the political branches may suddenly become less friendly to
notions of tribal sovereignty, and be tempted to exceed their constitutional
powers to the detriment of tribes. Tribes should be able to appeal to the safe
haven of the Constitution for protection from the political branches. For that
reason, the Court should not remove itself completely from issues of
sovereignty. Adopting a rule of explicit divestiture would not rob the Court
of its ability and authority to engage in judicial responsibilities. If limits are
to be found on federal plenary power, it is the Court that will need to find
them. In the meantime, the Court should retreat from implicit divestiture
and allow the recognition power to be exercised by the branches in which it
is vested.
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